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 (Ab)Originalism and Canada’s 
Constitution 
John Borrows 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Constitutions help people make judgments about how they should 
live together within a shared territory. They create expectations about 
how decisions should be made and carried into effect. They also help 
people address their disagreements. Constitutions identify, generate and 
organize relationships in ways which enhance or suppress activities of 
communities and individuals.1 They do so through an appeal to law, and 
they are often considered a country’s highest form of law. They authori-
tatively denote who or what someone or something is or does, within a 
governing framework. If actions are inconsistent with such law they are, 
not surprisingly, regarded as being unconstitutional, making contrary 
actions invalid, inapplicable or inoperable. Practitioners of constitutional 
law should note how their work can sustain, negate, inflect, modify or 
transform relationships and states of being. Like verbs, constitutions 
position us in time; they have a past, present and future tense. They 
explain what brought us together, and what should happen now and later 
on to sustain our togetherness and measured separateness. Thus, like 
verbs, constitutions regulate relationships through time; they link objects 
(persons, places and things) to a reciprocal series of obligations in the 
real world. 
                                                                                                             
 Robina Professor in Law, Policy and Society, University of Minnesota Law School. I 
would like to thank the following friends and colleagues for their helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of this article: Aimee Craft, Colin Desjarlais, Donna Greshner, Sakej Henderson, Leslie King, Sonia 
Lawrence, Johnny Mack, J. R. Miller, Aaron Mills, Val Napoleon, James Tully, Mark Walters and 
Jeremy Webber. 
1 For a discussion of the centrality of relationships in constitutional law, see Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), at 231-76; James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of 
Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Constitutional law is best explained as a verb. The word “constitu-
tion” comes from the Latin verb constituere, and is made up of two roots: 
con, which means “together”, and statuere, which means “to establish”. 
Thus, a constitution can be regarded as an activity of establishing 
something together. In this light a constitution acts on a person, place or 
thing, just like a verb. The Anishinaabe people of the Great Lakes attach 
a similar meaning to this activity, and also characterize constitutional law 
as a verb. The Anishinaabe use the word chi-inaakonige to describe 
constitutional law. Chi means great or large and inaakonige means to act 
on an object through making a judgment, deciding things a certain way, 
or agreeing on something.2 Thus, constitutional law is the great way of 
acting through judgment, guided decision-making and agreement. The 
Supreme Court of Canada also characterizes Canada’s Constitution as a 
verb — as an action and a shifting state of being. A prime activity 
associated with the country’s Constitution is that it “embraces the entire 
global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of 
constitutional authority”.3 Embracing, governing and exercising authority 
are necessary constitutional actions. Understanding the Constitution’s 
fluid state of being is also necessary in regulating governmental prac-
tices. In pursuing these activities the Court has said the Constitution is 
organic4 and animate;5 in fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly written 
that Canada’s Constitution is a living tree.6 
                                                                                                             
2 The Ojibwe Peoples Dictionary, online: University of Minnesota <http://ojibwe.lib.umn.
edu/main-entry/inaakonige-vai>. 
3 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 
148 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”]. 
4 Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Li-
censing Branch), [2001] S.C.J. No. 17, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, at para. 33 (S.C.C.): “The Constitution 
is an organic instrument, and must be interpreted flexibly to reflect changing circumstances:  
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).” There are times 
when the U.S. Constitution has also been called organic; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, at 
433 (1920). For an excellent article of this subject, see Brian Slattery, “The Organic Constitution: 
Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of Canada” (1996) Osgoode Hall L.J. 101 [hereinafter 
“Slattery”]. 
5 Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at 81 (S.C.C.): “The 
Canadian Constitution is not locked forever in a 119-year old casket. It lives and breathes and is 
capable of growing to keep pace with the growth of the country and its people.” 
6 The leading case on the Constitution as a living tree is Edwards v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124 (J.C.P.C.) [hereinafter “Persons Case”]. An excellent 
history of the case is Robert Sharpe & Patricia McMahon, The Persons Case: The Origins and 
Legacy of the Fight for Legal Personhood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). An example 
of contemporary references to the living tree can be found in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Same-Sex Marriage 
Reference”]. 
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Understanding constitutional law as an ongoing activity, which nour-
ishes a living entity, improves our judgments relating to its genesis, 
preservation and growth. Recognizing that a constitution has a temporal 
existence helps us balance the past, present and future when regulating 
our relationships. This article contends that constitutions are weakened if 
too much emphasis is placed on either their origins, or our current 
obsessions, or our future predictions regarding what they require. It is 
unhealthy to place too much stress on any one part of the roots, trunk or 
branches of any living tree. Each part needs to bear the weight of growth 
to be strong and durable. Likewise, Canada’s Constitution is at its 
strongest when interpretation is equally attentive to all forms of author-
ity, including arguments that appeal to its history, text and structure. 
These modes of argument must be similarly combined with doctrinal 
authority from previously decided cases, prudential arguments about the 
costs and benefits of a course of action, and ethical ideas which appeal to 
the ways Canadians think about their social commitments.7 
A balanced approach to constitutionalism, which draws on the meta-
phor of a living tree, can help keep Canada’s Constitution dynamic and 
strong. The “living tree” approach to constitutional interpretation was 
adopted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the so-called 
Persons Case.8 The question in the Persons Case was whether a woman 
could be appointed to the Senate under section 24 of the British North 
America Act, 1867,9 which states that “the Governor General shall from 
time to time ... summon qualified Persons to the Senate”. Since women 
could not hold political office when this section was enacted, it was 
argued that this section’s meaning could not be changed to accommodate 
shifting conceptions of a woman’s role in political life. The Supreme 
Court of Canada accepted this argument and decided that the framers’ 
understanding of the Constitution’s words could not change with the 
times.10 It therefore held that women could not be “qualified persons” 
                                                                                                             
7 For further discussions of these six modes of constitutional interpretation, see Robin 
Elliot, “References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitu-
tion” (2001), 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67, at 72-74; and Philip Bobbit, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the 
Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
8 Supra, note 6, at 136. For a comparative analysis of this metaphor in other constitutional 
contexts, see Vicki Jackson, “Constitutions as ‘Living Trees’? Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Interpretive Metaphors” (2006) 75 Fordham L.R. 921. 
9 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter “BNA Act”]. 
10 The Supreme Court wrote, in Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1928] S.C.J. No. 
19, [1928] S.C.R. 276, at 288 (S.C.C.): 
Passed in the year 1867, the various provisions of the B.N.A. Act ... bear to-day the same 
construction which the courts would, if then required to pass upon them, have given to 
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because they were excluded from political office at the time the Constitu-
tion was enacted. 
On appeal, the Privy Council disagreed with the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion and overturned its decision. It held that women were persons 
who could be qualified to be summoned to the Senate. The Court arrived 
at this conclusion by adopting a living tree interpretative approach. 
Justice Sankey, writing on behalf of the Privy Council, declared: 
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable 
of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the Act 
was to grant a constitution to Canada. “Like all written constitutions it 
has been subject to development through usage and convention” ... . 
Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board — it is 
certainly not their desire — to cut down the provisions of the Act by a 
narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and 
liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within 
certain fixed limits, may be mistress in her own house, as the Provinces 
to a great extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in 
theirs.11 
In the result, women were held to be persons who could be sum-
moned to the Senate because the Privy Council held that the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on the public meaning of “person” in 1867 was too 
narrow and technical a construction. A large and liberal interpretation 
required that any ambiguity about the meaning of the word “person” 
should be resolved by including women.12 
In the intervening years, the Supreme Court further developed the 
Privy Council’s living tree metaphor and designated it as the preferred 
approach to constitutional interpretation.13 As such, it has become the 
                                                                                                             
them when they were first enacted. If the phrase “qualified persons” in s. 24 includes 
women to-day, it has so included them since 1867. 
11 Supra, note 6, at 136 A.C. 
12 The Privy Council gave the government the burden of proving that the word “person” did 
not include women: “The word ‘person’ ... may include members of both sexes, and to those who 
ask why the word [person] should include females the obvious answer is why should it not? In these 
circumstances the burden is upon those who deny that the word includes women to make out their 
case”: Persons Case, supra, note 6, at 138 A.C. 
13 Same-Sex Marriage Reference, supra, note 6, at para. 22; British Columbia (Attorney 
General) v. Canada Trust Co., [1980] S.C.J. No. 86, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 466, at 478-79 (S.C.C.); 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, at para. 94 
(S.C.C.); Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] S.C.J. No. 57, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 
at 723 (S.C.C.); Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 52 (S.C.C.); Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 
23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, at para. 9 (S.C.C.); Reference re Provincial Electoral 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) (AB)ORIGINALISM AND CANADA’S CONSTITUTION 355 
dominant form of analysis in determining the Constitution’s meaning.14 
As now articulated, this approach allows the Court to look beyond 
historical understandings of a provision and give it meaning in the light 
of contemporary circumstances. The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
this fact in many cases. For example, in the Securities Reference,15 the 
Court wrote: “This metaphor has endured as the preferred approach in 
constitutional interpretation, ensuring ‘that Confederation can be adapted 
to new social realities’.”16 In the Same-Sex Marriage Reference,17 the 
Supreme Court wrote that “‘frozen concepts’ reasoning runs contrary to 
one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional 
interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of 
progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of 
modern life.”18 This led the Court to conclude that same-sex marriage 
was not prohibited by the Constitution even though “[s]everal centuries 
ago it would have been understood that marriage should be available 
only to opposite-sex couples.”19 In British Columbia (Attorney General) 
v. Canada Trust Co.,20 the Court reaffirmed the living nature of Canada’s 
Constitution, declaring that “[t]here is nothing static or frozen, narrow 
or technical, about the Constitution of Canada.”21 This led the Court to 
deny the idea that the Constitution created historically fixed categories. 
It wrote: “If the Canadian Constitution is to be regarded as a ‘living tree’ 
and legislative competence as ‘essentially dynamic’ ... then the determi-
nation of categories existing in 1867 becomes of little, other than 
historic, concern.”22 The Supreme Court reiterated this theme in Refer-
ence re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.),23 when it wrote: “The 
doctrine of the constitution as a living tree mandates that narrow techni-
                                                                                                             
Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at 180 (S.C.C.); R. v. Demers, [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, at para. 78 (S.C.C.); Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 23 (S.C.C.); Ontario Home Builders’ Assn. v. York Region 
Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 80, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929, at para. 145 (S.C.C.). 
14 For a series of essays on this topic, see Ian Peach et al., eds., A Living Tree: The Legacy 
of 1982 in Canada’s Political Evolution (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2007). 
15 Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Securities Reference”]. 
16 Id., at para. 56, also citing Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, 
supra, note 13, at para. 9, per Deschamps J. 
17 Supra, note 6. 
18 Id., at para. 22. 
19 Id., at para. 25. 
20 Supra, note 13. 
21 Id., at 478-79. 
22 Id., at 479 (emphasis in original). 
23 Supra, note 13. 
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cal approaches are to be eschewed,” which means that “the past plays a 
critical but non-exclusive role in determining the content of the rights 
and freedoms granted by the Charter.”24 As such, the Court wrote: “The 
tree is rooted in past and present institutions, but must be capable of 
growth to meet the future.”25 These observations led the Provincial 
Electoral Boundaries26 Court to conclude that the right to vote could not 
be “viewed as frozen by particular historical anomalies”. It said: “What 
must be sought is the broader philosophy underlying the historical 
development of the right to vote — a philosophy which is capable of 
explaining the past and animating the future.”27 The Supreme Court 
made a similar point in Canada (Combines Investigation Act Director of 
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.,28 in relation to Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms29 interpretation, when it wrote, a 
“constitution ... is drafted with an eye to the future” and therefore we 
must not “read the provisions of the Constitution like a last will and 
testament lest it become one”.30 These and numerous other decisions 
plainly demonstrate that a future-oriented living tree approach to consti-
tutional interpretation is dominant in Canada. 
There are good reasons for the dominance of the living tree approach 
in Canadian law. It invites democratic participation since it reminds us 
that constitutional law should be an ongoing activity.31 Its growth is 
cultivated on the historical, social, political, cultural, legal and economic 
grounds in which the constitution-as-practice is situated.32 People will be 
more inclined to get involved in the Constitution’s development if they 
realize that it responds to assorted demands on various terrains.33 A living 
constitution allows people with different interests to prune and graft it in 
accordance with its broader context. The Constitution is not just a dead 
piece of historical writing; it “facilitates — indeed, makes possible — a 
                                                                                                             
24 Id., at 180. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. 
29 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
30 Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 28, at 155. 
31 For an excellent discussion of this point as it relates to the balance of power between the 
Prime Minister and Parliament, see Peter Aucoin, Mark D. Jarvis & Lori Turnbull, Democratizing 
the Constitution: Reforming Responsible Government (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2011). 
32 Jack Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), at 
ch. 13. 
33 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, “Democratic Constitutionalism” in Jack M. Balkin & 
Reva B. Siegel, eds., The Constitution in 2020 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 25. 
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democratic political system by creating an orderly framework within 
which people may make political decisions”,34 as the Supreme Court 
wrote in the Quebec Secession Reference. 
Living tree analysis is also consistent with Canada’s broader consti-
tutional tradition because the country does not have a singular founding 
moment. Canada’s Constitution gradually evolved;35 it adapted to reflect 
changing social and political values throughout its history.36 While the 
passage of the BNA Act37 in 1867 marked an important stage in this 
evolution, section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 198238 makes it clear 
that Canada’s Constitution includes many other laws.39 Furthermore, the 
Constitution Act, 1867 (as the BNA Act is now called) also mandates a 
Dominion with a “Constitution similar in principle to that of the United 
Kingdom”.40 This means Canada’s Constitution draws on centuries of 
accreted experience with no one occasion dominating as a founding 
moment.41 Even in relation to particularly significant moments the 
organic nature of our tradition makes it appropriate to change the 
Constitution’s meaning over time.42 Indeed, Canada stands in contrast to 
the experience of the United States, which ratified a singular constitu-
tional text at a particular historic period.43 Viewing the Constitution as a 
                                                                                                             
34 Supra, note 3, at para. 78. 
35 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2010), at 1-2. 
The significance of Canada’s evolutionary constitution for Indigenous peoples is developed in 
John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 
[hereinafter “Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution”]. 
36 Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 3, at paras. 33, 46. 
37 Supra, note 9. 
38 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
39 See the Schedule to this Act, which non-exhaustively references 30 such constitutional 
Acts. 
40 Supra, note 9. 
41 In the Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 150, the Supreme Court 
observed: 
The Constitution is not a straitjacket. Even a brief review of our constitutional history 
demonstrates periods of momentous and dramatic change. Our democratic institutions 
necessarily accommodate a continuous process of discussion and evolution ... 
42 Ontario Home Builders’ Assn. v. York Region Board of Education, supra, note 13, at 
para. 145 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of the organic nature of Canada’s Constitution, see Slattery, 
supra, note 4. 
43 For a discussion of the differences between Canadian and U.S. approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation, see Peter W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights and American Theories of 
Interpretation” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87. For a discussion of the development and ratification 
of the U.S. Constitution, see Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-
1788 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010). 
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living tree makes more sense in a country like Canada, which has always 
been engaged in an “ongoing process of constitutional development”.44 
II. ABNORMAL ORIGINALISM 
Despite the dominance of the living tree approach to Canadian con-
stitutional interpretation, unfortunately, there is one set of relationships to 
which this balanced approach does not apply — that involving Aborigi-
nal peoples. The living tree does not operate when considering Abo-
riginal and treaty rights because history is said to be determinative in this 
field. The Supreme Court has concluded that Aboriginal and treaty rights 
are limited by the parties’ historic intentions and the public meaning 
attaching to original actions. While non-discriminatory understandings of 
history must guide constitutional interpretation, the Court’s current 
approach to Aboriginal rights overemphasizes the past by restricting the 
Constitution’s meaning to certain foundational moments. This method, 
which goes by the name originalism, is alive and well in the field of 
Aboriginal rights. 
The justifications for an originalist approach are varied.45 Neverthe-
less, they generally coalesce around an idea that the law has a specific 
historic meaning to which judges must defer. As such, originalism has 
been called “a paradigmatic form of legal positivism”.46 It gives promi-
nence to the subjective intentions and/or so-called objective public mean-
ings of a constitution’s drafters, ratifiers and/or receivers.47 Originalism 
is often used in an exclusivist, either/or manner, prohibiting and discour-
                                                                                                             
44 Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 52. 
45 The people or group whose intentions count in understanding constitutional meaning at a 
foundational moment can vary: see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, “Living Originalism” (2009) 
59 Duke L.J. 239. For a discussion of the distinction between old and new originalists, see Randy E. 
Barnett, “An Originalism for Non-originalists” (1999) 45 Loy. L.R. 611. Old originalism is perhaps 
best represented by the writings of Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 
1990). New originalism is represented by Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Keith E. Whittington, 
“The New Originalism” (2004) 2 Geo. J.L. Pub. Pol’y 599. 
46 Peter Smith & Robert Tuttle, “Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Interpretation” 
(2011) 86 Notre Dame L.R. 693, at 695. 
47 “‘Meaning’ is a capacious concept, and indeed, it has many different meanings, including 
semantic content, purposes, intentions, practical entailments, and cultural associations. Conceived 
most broadly, ‘meaning’ includes a vast array of cultural associations, traditions, conventions, and 
background assumptions”: Jack Balkin, “Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism” (2012) U. Ill. 
L.R. 815, at 828. 
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aging modes of constitutional interpretation based on other grounds.48 
While attempts have been made to reconcile originalism and living tree 
constitutionalism,49 many are skeptical about the success of these 
efforts.50 Originalism generally places dispositive weight on formative 
historical understandings and meanings, whereas living tree constitution-
alism draws guidance from history but gives it lesser weight.51 Original-
ism is perhaps best known for its role in U.S. constitutional law, where 
many prominent members of the Supreme Court and legal academy 
strongly support this approach.52 It has also been the subject of substan-
tial critique.53 
Originalism’s place in Canadian constitutional law is incongruous.54 
The Supreme Court has explicitly distanced itself from this practice.55 In 
                                                                                                             
48 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2012), 
at 15.9(f) and 60.1(e). 
49 Books and articles have been written trying to convince originalists that originalism is 
consistent with other modes of interpretation: see Jack Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011). In Canada, there have also been attempts to argue that originalism 
and living tree constitutionalism need not be mutually exclusive: see Bradley Miller, “Origin Myth: 
The Persons Case, The Living Tree, and the New Originalism” [hereinafter “Miller, ‘Origin Myth’”] 
in Grant Huscroft & Bradley Miller, eds., The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 120; Bradley Miller, 
“Beguiled by Metaphors: The ‘Living Tree’ and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” 
(2009) 22 Can. J.L. & Jur. 331. 
50 Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, “Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism” 
(2009) 103 NW.U.L. Rev. 663; John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, “Original Interpretive 
Principles as the Core of Originalism” (2000) 24 Const. Commentary 371, at 381; Joel Alicea, 
“Originalism in Crisis: The Movement Towards Indeterminate Originalism”, online: <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1613065>. 
51 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), supra, note 13, at 507-509 
(S.C.C.). 
52 See Steven G. Calabresi, ed., Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate (Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery, 2007); Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
53 Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding” (1980) 60 B.U.L. 
Rev. 204; Mitchell N. Berman, “Originalism Is Bunk” (2009) 84 N.Y.L. Rev. 1; David A. Straus, 
The Living Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Robert W. Bennett & 
Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2011); Thomas Colby, “The Sacrifice of the New Originalism” (2011) 99 Geo. L.J. 713. 
54 Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” in Grant Huscroft & Ian 
Brodie, eds., Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2004) 345, 
at 348. However, for an argument that Canada’s dominant constitutional modes of interpretation are 
consistent with originalism, see Miller, “Origin Myth”, supra, note 49, at 120. For an argument that 
originalism existed within Supreme Court Justice Wilson’s judgments, see Adam Dodek, “The 
Dutiful Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s Conception of Charter Rights and Their 
Limits” in J. Cameron, ed. (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 331. 
55 For commentary see Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent”, id. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada did not respond positively to interpreting the Charter in 
light of the drafters’ intent; see Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), supra, 
note 13, at 509: 
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the Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board) case,56 it wrote: 
“This Court has never adopted the practice more prevalent in the United 
States of basing constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of 
the framers of the Constitution.”57 Academic commentary has also 
maintained that “originalism has never enjoyed any significant support in 
Canada”.58 Despite these observations, the Supreme Court and other 
constitutional participants might be surprised to discover that originalism 
is flourishing under our noses because the practice does not quite go by 
this name in Canada. In this country it goes by the name Aboriginalism. 
The Supreme Court’s abnormal originalism, or (ab)originalism, 
measures the constitutionality of Aboriginal claims by attributing public 
meaning to events that are regarded as being foundational to constitu-
tional relations between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown at some point 
in the past.59 For example, Aboriginal rights can only be claimed if they 
flow from Aboriginal practices that were “integral to their distinctive 
culture” prior to European contact.60 Similarly, Aboriginal title can only 
be recognized and affirmed if a group occupied land prior to the assertion 
                                                                                                             
[T]he rights, freedoms and values embodied in the Charter in effect become frozen in 
time to the moment of adoption with little or no possibility of growth, development and 
adjustment to changing societal needs. ... If the newly planted “living tree” which is the 
Charter is to have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken 
to ensure that historical materials ... do not stunt its growth. 
56 [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.). 
57 Id., at 409. 
58 Peter W. Hogg, “Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court” in Jeffrey Goldswor-
thy, ed., Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
55, at 83. 
59 It may be argued that originalism is textually necessary in Canada’s Constitution because 
the word Aboriginal comes from the Latin ab origine, meaning from the beginning, or ancestraux in 
the French version: see R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 32 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]. However, the word “Aboriginal”, like the label “Indian”, is a 
European invention, and the courts have held that non-native concepts should be applied with great 
caution when discussing the application of “Western” law to native peoples: see Amodu Tijani v. 
Secretary (Southern Nigeria), [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at 402-403, cited with approval in Calder v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313, at 354 (S.C.C.), where the 
Privy Council stated: 
Their Lordships make the preliminary observation that in interpreting the native title to 
land, not only in Southern Nigeria, but other parts of the British Empire, much caution is 
essential. There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render that title con-
ceptually in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under 
English law. But this tendency has to be held in check closely. 
The problem of describing Indigenous peoples in Western terms was discussed in great detail in 
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 
60 Van der Peet, id., at para. 46. 
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of settler sovereignty.61 Likewise, treaty rights must be proved by 
reference to the common intention between the parties at the time the 
agreement was made.62 In each instance, constitutional rights are contin-
gent upon the Court creating an original public meaning for a past event, 
when such rights were first recognized,63 “crystallized”,64 or contem-
plated by the parties (in the case of treaties).65 
While it is perfectly appropriate to draw upon history in considering 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, holding that rights are solely dependent on 
past recognition, crystallization or contemplation is a significant break 
with our country’s dominant constitutional traditions. This is a problem 
for Canadian constitutional law more generally and for Aboriginal 
peoples in particular. Therefore, in order to understand and overcome 
Canadian originalism this paper examines its anomalous existence and 
identifies genuine alternatives to it. These proposals are drawn from 
longstanding and current constitutional practices and principles. They are 
aimed at strengthening and reinforcing Canada’s constitutional law by 
making it more internally consistent. They confirm, adjust, enlarge and 
transform our Constitution to bring it in line with its other constituent 
parts, in accordance with its highest traditions. 
Originalism must be supplanted within section 35(1) because it cre-
ates a double standard within Canadian constitutional law. Its application 
constructs an unbalanced interpretative landscape that subjects Aborigi-
nal and treaty rights to greater constitutional constraints than would 
occur under a living tree approach. Originalism, as applied to Aboriginal 
peoples, excludes the growth of rights not connected to founding 
intentions and events. (Ab)originalism considers constitutional meanings 
to be fixed and limited by particular historical moments. This stands in 
contrast with a living tree approach that is appropriately attentive to a 
law’s roots but is more forward-looking in its approach. Originalism 
and living tree constitutionalism both take meaning from the past, but 
originalism does not tolerate change in relation to “new social realities” 
                                                                                                             
61 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 
144 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
62 R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 14 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Marshall (I)”]. 
63 Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 28. 
64 Delgamuukw, supra, note 61, at para. 145. For a critique of the crystallization theory of 
aboriginal title, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537, at 558 [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘Sovereignty’s 
Alchemy’”]. 
65 Marshall (I), supra, note 62, at paras. 58, 60. 
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in the same way as a living tree approach.66 While historic legal interpre-
tations should be regarded as helpful by way of analogy when dealing 
with sui generis Aboriginal and treaty rights, they should not be used to 
deny rights that may spring from other sources.67 History should not 
exclusively determine the source and scope of Aboriginal rights.68 
Unfortunately, originalism in an Aboriginal context does not sufficiently 
draw upon other modes of constitutional interpretation which are also 
attentive to the Constitution’s present and future tense. 
To create greater balance within the Constitution, Aboriginal and 
treaty rights must be part of Canada’s living tree. This is particularly 
important because Indigenous societies have the deepest roots on this 
continent. Their prior and ongoing connection with the land is the soil 
from which subsequent relations grow.69 As with other constitutional 
provisions, Aboriginal rights should be able to continually expand and 
mature. Aboriginal and treaty rights should not be automatically re-
stricted by meanings that attached to them at the time of contact, asser-
tion of sovereignty or negotiation. Such limitations sever Aboriginal 
relationships from the constitution’s broader terrain and threaten the 
sustainability of Canada’s constitutional ecology. 
Attempts have been made to justify the differential treatment of Abo-
riginal peoples within Canada’s constitution based on the Supreme 
Court’s observation that “Aboriginal rights cannot, however, be defined 
on the basis of the philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment.”70 
This acknowledgment opens important space for recognizing constitu-
tional influences arising from non-European sources.71 However, as the 
                                                                                                             
66 The Supreme Court wrote that a living tree approach would allow confederation to 
change with new social realities in Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, 
supra, note 13, at para. 9, per Deschamps J., citing Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries 
(Sask.), supra, note 13, at 180. 
67 Some of these alternative sources might be Indigenous peoples’ own laws, human rights 
law, international Indigenous law, as well as laws based on textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential 
and ethical modes of constitutional interpretation, see Phillip Bobbitt, “Methods of Constitutional 
Argument” (1988-1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 449. 
68 See John Borrows & Len Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it 
Make a Difference?” (1997) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 9; Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, 
note 35. 
69 John Borrows, “Ground Rules: Indigenous Treaties in Canada and New Zealand” (2006) 
22 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 188. 
70 Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 19. 
71 There are many sources of constitutional authority in Canada that are not based in Euro-
pean thought, such as the role the International Declaration on Human Rights played in the drafting 
of the Charter: see Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 348-60 (S.C.C.); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). The Supreme Court has also recognized that 
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Court indicates,72 recognition of Aboriginal difference should not sever 
Aboriginal rights from broader constitutional traditions that seek to limit 
the state’s reach.73 Placing limits on government action is clearly an 
important part of our constitutional regime.74 This is also the case with 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
observed in the Sparrow case,75 section 35(1) “gives a measure of control 
over government conduct and a strong check on legislative power”.76 
Thus, Aboriginal rights should not be placed completely outside of the 
stream of constitutional history when it comes to considering section 
35(1)’s power to constrain governments.77 While Aboriginal rights do not 
flow from the “liberal enlightenment view [that] rights are held by all 
people in society because each person is entitled to dignity and re-
spect”,78 as with other constitutional laws they configure and constrain 
government action, and thus are general and universal in an important 
respect. In this light, in Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada explained 
the place of Aboriginal rights in Canada’s constitution as follows: 
“s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, represents the culmination of a 
long and difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts for 
the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights”.79 As such, the Court 
acknowledged that Aboriginal rights placed constraints on the Crown in 
                                                                                                             
Aboriginal rights partially flow from Indigenous peoples’ own laws: Delgamuukw, supra, note 61, at 
para. 147; Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at paras. 38-42; R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] S.C.J. 
No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, at paras. 45-54 (S.C.C.). The Indigenous sources of Canada’s 
constitution is discussed in Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 68. 
72 Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 19: “Although equal in importance and significance 
to the rights enshrined in the Charter, aboriginal rights must be viewed differently from Charter 
rights because they are rights held only by aboriginal members of Canadian society.” 
73 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1077 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Sparrow”]: “... the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any 
government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights”. For a discussion of the place 
of similarity and difference in Aboriginal and treaty rights, see Patrick Macklem, Indigenous 
Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
74 For a critique of the prevalence of rights discourse in Canadian law, see Andrew Petter, 
The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010). For a discussion of the limitations of rights discourse in an Indigenous context, 
see Christopher Manfredi, “Fear, Hope and Misunderstanding: Unintended Consequences and the 
Marshall Decision” in Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions / Strategies / 
Direction (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004). 
75 Supra, note 73. 
76 Id., at 110. 
77 See John Borrows, “Let Obligations be Done” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven & Jeremy 
Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Aboriginal 
Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 201, at 212, from which the argument in this paragraph is 
drawn. 
78 Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 18. 
79 Sparrow, supra, note 73, at para. 53. 
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ways consistent with those that governments encounter in other contexts. 
As the Court wrote: 
Section 35 calls for a just settlement for aboriginal peoples. It renounces 
the old rules of the game under which the Crown established courts of 
law and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims 
made by the Crown.80 
Thus, though they have a different source, Aboriginal rights parallel 
constraints on the Crown that flow from the liberal enlightenment, and 
thus are part of its living tree. Consider how limitations on government 
action in the broader context are vital to the Constitution’s development. 
For instance, in 1215 the issuance of the Magna Carta restricted Crown 
rights relative to certain classes of individuals (wealthy landowners), 
which slowly expanded through time.81 Despite its limitations,82 the 
Magna Carta’s constraint on Crown power is considered to be a pillar of 
democratic constitutionalism.83 Similarly, the so-called Glorious Revolu-
tion of 1688 circumscribed the Crown’s authority and made the monar-
chy subject to Parliament in many important ways.84 The English Bill of 
                                                                                                             
80 Id., at para. 54. At para. 55: 
The approach to be taken with respect to interpreting the meaning of s. 35(1) is derived 
from general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to aboriginal 
rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional provision itself. Here, we will sketch 
the framework for an interpretation of ‘recognized and affirmed’ that, in our opinion, 
gives appropriate weight to the constitutional nature of these words. 
81 Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 63: 
The evolution of our democratic tradition can be traced back to the Magna Carta (1215) 
and before, through the long struggle for Parliamentary supremacy which culminated in 
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the emergence of representative political institutions in 
the colonial era, the development of responsible government in the 19th century, and 
eventually, the achievement of Confederation itself in 1867 ... “[T]he Canadian tradition” 
... is “one of evolutionary democracy moving in uneven steps toward the goal of univer-
sal suffrage and more effective representation”. 
82 See R. v. Rahey, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, at 634 (S.C.C.): “The great 
defect of Magna Carta, however, lay in its failure to provide adequate mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the rights it purported to guarantee.” 
83 See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Aboriginal Right” in 
Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000): 
Magna Carta would have been received as part of the applicable statute law in all the 
common law provinces. As a fundamental part of the British constitution, no doubt it 
applies in Quebec as well, despite the reintroduction of French civil law by the Quebec 
Act, 14 Geo. III (1774), c. 83 (U.K.). The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, supra 
note 64, provides that Canada shall have “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the 
United Kingdom”. 
84 For a general discussion of this history, see Edward Vallance, The Glorious Revolution: 
1688, Britain’s Fight for Liberty (London: Little Brown, 2006) [hereinafter “Vallance”]; L.G. 
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Rights, which sprang from the revolution, obligated the Crown to raise 
and spend money with the consent of elected parliamentary officials and 
not of its own accord.85 Though these gains were somewhat ambiguous at 
the time,86 the “Glorious Revolution” has become an important constitu-
tional source and many regard it as a cornerstone of liberty throughout 
the British Commonwealth.87 British North Americans enjoyed similar 
restraints on the exercise of the Crown prerogative when responsible 
government came to non-Aboriginal Canadians in the 1850s in the 
Canadian and the Maritime colonies.88 Furthermore, the American and 
French revolutions of the late 1700s, which also purported to restrain 
Crown sovereignty relative to individual rights, are also regarded as 
being an essential step in democracy’s development. Canada’s own 
Charter is in this tradition.89 
While Aboriginal and treaty rights are exercisable only by Aboriginal 
peoples, and thus do not flow from the liberal enlightenment in this 
respect, this should not cause us to overlook the truth that they likewise 
exist to restrain government action. They are living constitutional 
traditions. While Aboriginal and treaty rights flow from sources beyond 
the liberal enlightenment, they nevertheless are synchronous with these 
broader constitutional traditions: they also constrain governments. Thus, 
though we must take care to ensure that while we appropriately define 
Aboriginal rights as having different contours, we must also ensure that 
we do not place them entirely outside of the Constitution’s broader 
framework. Unfortunately, the Court’s use of originalism in defining 
Aboriginal rights is outside the Constitution’s wider framework. 
Not only is originalism out of step with Canada’s wider constitu-
tional traditions, it also risks perpetuating the discrimination Aborigi-
nal peoples have encountered throughout the years.90 This is because 
                                                                                                             
Schwoerer, ed., The Revolution of 1688-89: Changing Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
85 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of 
the Crown, 1689, December 16, 1689, at 67-73, vol. 9 of Dandy Pickering, ed., The Statutes at Large 
(Cambridge: Bentham, 1762-1804), and 122-28 of English Historical Documents, 1660-1714, 
Andrew Browning, ed. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1953). 
86 Vallance, supra, note 84, at 164, 177. 
87 Jonathon I. Israel, ed., The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and 
Its World Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
88 Patrick Malcolmson & Richard Meyers, The Canadian Regime: An Introduction to Par-
liamentary Government in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 37-54. 
89 The Charter constrains the Crown relative to individual citizens and obligates it to respect 
enumerated rights in the document. 
90 For a significant period of time assimilation guided the Crown’s actions towards Abori-
ginal peoples, as illustrated by the following statement: “Our object is to continue until there is not a 
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originalism links and then limits interpretation to periods when the 
Constitution was formed. Since Canada’s legal history is saturated with 
discrimination towards Aboriginal peoples,91 constitutional standards 
should not pass along the troubling attitudes, behaviours and intentions 
of past generations of constitutional actors.92 Again, there is nothing 
wrong with using history as a constitutional standard if it respects the 
parties’ political agency, and such history is tested, contextualized and 
harmonized with our entire constitutional traditions. For example, treaty 
interpretation generally requires a greater degree of deference to history 
than do Aboriginal rights cases. Conversely, the weight of history should 
be diminished in Aboriginal rights cases. This is because Aboriginal 
agency is severely restricted when the Court interprets rights through the 
prism of unilateral Crown actions. Quite simply, under current ap-
proaches, Aboriginal rights cases do not consider the historic or contem-
porary perspectives of Aboriginal peoples regarding Crown unilateralism. 
These cases take no account of Aboriginal views on the negative impacts 
of perpetually limiting their rights by the moment of Crown contact and 
sovereign assertion. The fact that the Crown’s historic actions are 
grounded in discriminatory assumptions regarding Aboriginal inferiority 
should further diminish history’s influence. Treaty interpretation, on the 
other hand, generally purports to respect the parties’ agency when 
assigning them meaning. While treaty history can itself be problematic, 
due to power imbalances and differences of opinion, its interpretation 
at least attempts to consider Aboriginal peoples’ views at the time they 
were signed. History should always be calibrated to non-discriminatory 
standards for judgment when used as a source of constitutional authority; 
it should rarely be determinative. Contemporary constitutional standards 
should not replicate views held by past generations of Canadian leaders 
                                                                                                             
single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic”: Duncan Campbell Scott, 
Testimony before the Special Committee of the House of Commons examining the Indian Act 
amendments of 1920, National Archives of Canada, Record Group 10, vol. 6810, file 470-2-3, vol. 
7, 55 (L-3), 63 (N-3), quoted in John Leslie, The Historical Development of the Indian Act, 2d ed. 
(Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Treaties and Historical Research 
Branch, 1978), at 114. 
91 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking 
Back, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996), at 137-200, 245-592 [hereinafter 
“Looking Forward, Looking Back”]; Sparrow, supra, note 73. 
92 See R. v. Côté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at para. 53 (S.C.C.), citing 
Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1, at 42 (H.C.): 
Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize the rights 
and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and dis-
criminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted. 
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who regarded Aboriginal peoples as inferior and denied their governance 
and land rights.93 Constitutional doctrines that transmit these and other 
historically discriminatory beliefs should have no place in Canada’s 
highest law.94 
The Privy Council avoided adopting ancient discriminatory customs 
as constitutional standards in the Persons Case. It did so after consider-
ing the diminished legal and political status of women from before the 
time of the Roman Empire through the early 20th century. It noted that 
“The exclusion of women from all public offices is a relic of days more 
barbarous than ours.”95 It therefore rejected the law’s discriminatory 
history as an aid to constitutional interpretation. The Court wrote that an 
“appeal to Roman Law and to early English decisions is not of itself a 
secure foundation on which to build the interpretation of the British 
North America Act of 1867”.96 In the face of such bias the Court held that 
“[t]he appeal to history ... is not conclusive”.97 In so ruling, the Privy 
Council discarded arguments rooted in historical discrimination against 
women. The Supreme Court should take the same approach in relation to 
Indigenous peoples and similarly reject arguments rooted in historical 
discrimination.98 Limiting Indigenous rights to what was integral to their 
                                                                                                             
93 For an historical overview of these views in the Canadian legal context, see Sidney Har-
ring, White Man’s Law: Native People in Nineteenth Century Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1998), at 8-10; Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The 
Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990); J.R. Miller, 
Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-white Relations in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2000), at 103-312. For an examination of how Aboriginal peoples can still be 
labelled as inferior in the present context, see Wayne Warry, Ending Denial: Understanding 
Aboriginal Issues (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008). 
94 The Supreme Court has indicated that it is inappropriate to view Aboriginal peoples as 
being inferior: see Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), supra, note 59, at 346-47: 
The assessment and interpretation of the historical documents and enactments tendered in 
evidence must be approached in the light of present-day research and knowledge disre-
garding ancient concepts formulated when understanding of the customs and culture of 
our original people was rudimentary and incomplete and when they were thought to be 
wholly without cohesion, laws or cultures, in effect a subhuman species. 
95 Persons Case, supra, note 6, at para. 9. 
96 Id., at para. 39. 
97 Id., at para. 37. 
98 Justice Binnie, formerly of the Supreme Court of Canada, would seem to agree. In an 
article dismissing originalism and arguing for living tree constitutionalism in Canada, he wrote: 
Canadians will remember that until the last 50 years or so Aboriginal peoples in Canada 
were effectively denied almost all civil rights on the basis, and I quote a Nova Scotia 
judge writing in 1929, that: 
The savages’ rights of sovereignty even of ownership were never recognized 
... In my judgment the Treaty of 1752 is not a treaty at all and is not to be 
treated as such; it is at best a mere agreement made by the Governor and 
council with a handful of Indians. 
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distinctive cultures prior to European contact or Crown sovereignty 
should “become a relic of days more barbarous than ours”. 
Thus, even though discriminatory customs historically developed 
among European nations to take land and governance away from Indige-
nous peoples, such customs should not form part of our law today.99 As 
noted, these laws were based on assessments of Indigenous inferiority.100 
For example, past discriminatory assessments of Indigenous peoples’ 
legal and political status are found in North America’s leading case on 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, Johnson v. McIntosh,101 where Chief Justice 
John Marshall wrote: 
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe 
were eager to appropriate to themselves as much of it as they could 
respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the 
ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and religion of its 
                                                                                                             
Eventually our Supreme Court declared this approach to be “unacceptable” and brought 
to bear a more contemporaneous view of aboriginal peoples and of federal responsibili-
ties under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In 1984, I acted for the federal 
government in a case that decided that exercise by the Crown of its power to accept a 
surrender of Indian lands creates a trust enforceable in the courts, a conclusion which 
would have been unthinkable in 1867. However, the evolving view of the courts toward 
Aboriginal rights, initially signalled in Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, 
in 1973, in effect was endorsed by the political leadership when they included a recogni-
tion of existing treaty and aboriginal rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Ian Binnie, “Interpreting the Constitution: Living Tree vs. Original Meaning”, Policy Options 
(October 2007), online: <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct07/binnie.pdf>, 104, at 106-107. 
99 See R. v. Côté, supra, note 92, at para. 53: 
... a static and retrospective interpretation of s. 35(1) cannot be reconciled with the noble 
and prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights 
in the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the respondent’s proposed interpretation risks 
undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered 
by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive 
cultures of pre-existing aboriginal societies. To quote the words of Brennan J. in Mabo v. 
Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.), at p. 42: 
Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognize 
the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants of settled co-
lonies, an unjust and discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be 
accepted. 
100 Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy”, supra, note 64, at 558-67. 
101 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). For further critiques concerning discrimination in John-
son v. McIntosh and other cases relying on the doctrine of discovery, see Robert J. Miller et al., 
Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America 
Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Stuart 
Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: 
The Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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inhabitants offered an apology for considering them as a people over 
whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy.102 
Unilaterally declaring that Indigenous peoples had lesser rights when 
constitutional principles were formed (due to alleged inferiorities in their 
character, religion and genius) does not bode well for originalism. At a 
minimum the doctrine of discovery, using the language of the Persons 
Case, should be considered “a relic of days more barbarous than ours”, 
rather than the foundation of the law. It does not respect Aboriginal 
peoples’ agency. Unfortunately, this doctrine explicitly undergirds 
Aboriginal and treaty rights jurisprudence in Canada to the present day. 
In 1984 the doctrine of discovery was accepted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada as one of the country’s constitutional foundations. As the Court 
observed in Guerin v. Canada:103 
The principle of discovery ... gave the ultimate title in the land in a 
particular area to the nation which had discovered and claimed it. In 
that respect at least the Indians’ rights in the land were obviously 
diminished.104 
The doctrine of discovery has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.105 
Following the example of the Persons Case, as noted, the Supreme Court 
should not apply discriminatory customs of this kind in building Can-
ada’s highest law. The appeal to history in matters where discrimination 
has guided past traditions should not be conclusive when deciding the 
foundation of our current laws.106 The doctrine of discovery should be 
challenged as being contrary to Canada’s broader constitutional approaches. 
For example, when the Crown arrived in North America, Indigenous 
peoples’ territories were not barren and deserted.107 In fact, despite 
affirming discovery at most points in the jurisprudence, in at least one 
instance the Supreme Court of Canada has written: “At the time of the 
                                                                                                             
102 Id., at 573-74. 
103 [1984] S.C.J. No. 45, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Guerin”]. 
104 Id., at 378. 
105 Sparrow, supra, note 73, at 1103: “[T]here was from the outset never any doubt that 
sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the 
Crown”; Delgamuukw, supra, note 61, at para. 145: “Crown did not gain this title until it asserted 
sovereignty over the land in question. Because it does not make sense to speak of a burden on the 
underlying title before that title existed, aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was 
asserted.” 
106 Paraphrasing Persons Case, supra, note 6, at 134. 
107 Richard Lillich et al., International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy and Prac-
tice, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2006), at 31-34; Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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assertion of British sovereignty, North America was not treated by the 
Crown as res nullius.”108 Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples also recommended the rejection of the doctrine of discovery 
because it is “legally, morally and factually wrong”.109 In light of these 
observations, and in line with the Privy Council’s approach in the 
Persons Case, we would do well to apply the following caution to the 
doctrine of discovery: “Customs are apt to develop into traditions which 
are stronger than law and remain unchallenged long after the reason for 
them has disappeared.”110 It is time to reject archaic and misguided 
customs and traditions that lie at the heart of Canadian constitutional law, 
particularly when they rest on Indigenous peoples’ legal inferiority. The 
reasons for considering Aboriginal peoples to be constitutionally inferior 
have been discredited and should have long since disappeared. It would 
be incongruous if such approaches continued under the guise of original-
ism. 
Despite deep problems underlying Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court has not employed a living tree approach when 
considering the rights of Aboriginal peoples. In fact, the only time the 
Supreme Court considered the living tree approach as applied to Abo-
riginal peoples it was rejected on the facts of the case. The case was R. v. 
Blais,111 where the Court was asked to find that Métis peoples were 
Indians under sections of the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agree-
ment (“NRTA”).112 The Supreme Court rebuffed this assertion on the 
grounds that the language, historical context and views of the NRTA’s 
drafters did not support the Métis’ claim.113 When the Court was asked to 
apply a living tree interpretative approach, it refused, and wrote: 
We decline the appellant’s invitation to expand the historical 
purpose of para. 13 on the basis of the “living tree” doctrine enunciated 
                                                                                                             
108 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra, note 71, at para. 132. Unfortunately, despite criti-
quing res nullius, the doctrine of discovery applied in this case because the Aboriginal peoples were 
regarded as being nomadic at the time that the Crown asserted sovereignty, such that they could not 
claim exclusive possession of the land they used. 
109 See Looking Forward, Looking Back, supra, note 91, at recommendation 1.16.2, at 696: 
Federal, provincial and territorial government further the process of renewal by: (a) 
acknowledging that concepts such as terra nullius and the doctrine of discovery are 
factually, legally and morally wrong 
110 Persons Case, supra, note 6, at 134. 
111 [2003] S.C.J. No. 44, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blais”]. 
112 For a history of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, see Frank Tough, “Metis and 
Treaty Rights: The Forgotten Constitution: The Natural Resources Transfer Agreements and Indian 
Livelihood Rights, ca. 1925-1930” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 999. 
113 Blais, supra, note 111, at paras. 19-34. 
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by Lord Sankey L.C. with reference to the 1867 British North America 
Act: Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.), 
at p. 136. ... 
This Court has consistently endorsed the living tree principle as a 
fundamental tenet of constitutional interpretation. Constitutional 
provisions are intended to provide “a continuing framework for the 
legitimate exercise of governmental power”: Hunter v. Southam Inc., 
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, per Dickson J. (as he then was), at p. 155. But at 
the same time, this Court is not free to invent new obligations foreign 
to the original purpose of the provision at issue. The analysis must be 
anchored in the historical context of the provision. ... Similarly, Binnie 
J. emphasized the need for attentiveness to context when he noted in R. 
v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 14, that “‘[g]enerous’ rules of 
interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of after-
the-fact largesse.” Again the statement, made with respect to the 
interpretation of a treaty, applies here.114 
In the Blais case the Supreme Court held that the application of a 
living tree approach would produce a result that was inconsistent with 
the NRTA’s “original purpose”. An interpretative approach that conveyed 
“after-the-fact” generosity was thus rejected. However, “after-the-fact 
largesse” is precisely the kind of generosity resulting from the Persons 
Case, particularly as developed by the Supreme Court over the past 70 
years. Women were qualified “persons” to be appointed as Senators 
within the Constitution despite a historic context that denied women the 
right to vote or claim political office. 
III. ORIGINALISM AND THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 
In refusing to apply a living tree approach in the Blais case, it should 
be noted that the Court supported its opinion by applying the “generous 
rules of interpretation” that apparently exist to benefit Aboriginal 
peoples. Ironically, while expansive in one respect, these canons of 
construction ultimately constrain Aboriginal and treaty rights in the way 
they are used by the Court. This is because the Court says these “special 
rules” are only “dictated by the special difficulties of ascertaining what in 
fact was agreed to” when law was made.115 Notice the originalism 
communicated in the Court’s formulation of the canons of construction. 
                                                                                                             
114 Id., at paras. 39-40. 
115 Marshall (I), supra, note 62, at para. 14. 
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Since the distinctive rules for interpreting Aboriginal rights only exist to 
help the Court weigh evidence of historic purposes, these limits pose 
substantial problems for Aboriginal peoples.116 They cannot be used to 
go beyond a law’s original meaning, as can occur in living tree jurispru-
dence.117 It is ironic that allegedly generous rules would have the effect 
of ultimately restricting interpretations of Aboriginal rights, especially 
when these rules appear very generous on the surface. 
Generously construing intentions when Aboriginal peoples were 
viewed as inferior is not the same thing as unequivocally repudiating 
laws rooted in such discriminatory beliefs. Generosity should lead the 
Court to acknowledge that many of the government’s formative policies 
were “wrong, have caused great harm, and have no place in our country”, 
as the government of Canada acknowledged in its 2008 Statement of 
Apology to Aboriginal peoples.118 Regrettably, the Court has not yet 
taken this step in relation to the way it developed and applies its canons 
of construction. Thus, these special rules sustain original intentions and 
public meanings, though they try to put them in their best light, troubling 
as these experiences may be. Thus, these special rules apply despite the 
fact that many of the country’s formative laws and policies were de-
signed to undermine Aboriginal peoples’ lands, governance and life-
styles. This should raise awareness that any interpretive “generosity” 
associated with originalism has its limits. It is a generosity that tacitly 
emphasizes the identification of problematic past intentions. This is 
opposed to the forward-looking view of living tree jurisprudence that 
incorporates Indigenous legal traditions,119 adopts a “progressive inter-
pretation”, “accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life”120 
                                                                                                             
116 The Supreme Court held that there is a “boundary that must not be crossed” when inter-
preting Aboriginal rights: Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.), [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mitchell”]. This boundary line 
is set by originalism. 
117 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra, note 13, at 180: 
The doctrine of the constitution as a living tree mandates that narrow technical approach-
es are to be eschewed. ... It also suggests that the past plays a critical but non-exclusive 
role in determining the content of the rights and freedoms granted by the Charter. The 
tree is rooted in past and present institutions, but must be capable of growth to meet the 
future. 
118 Government of Canada, Statement of Apology, June 11, 2008, online: <http://www.
aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644>. 
119 See, infra, Part V of this paper, where it should become clear that the extension of a 
living tree approach into s. 35(1) jurisprudence and beyond would lead to a greater scrutiny of 
originalism’s colonial roots and enhance the role of Indigenous peoples’ own role in the constitu-
tion’s ongoing formation. 
120 Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, supra, note 13, at para. 94. 
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and rejects historical discrimination.121 “Generous” originalism will not 
produce as many benefits as living tree constitutionalism because the 
framework in which it applies is much narrower. 
1. Treaties, Originalism and the Canons of Construction 
I have been arguing that distinctive canons of construction applicable 
to Aboriginal and treaty rights, unfortunately, do not function in a 
manner analogous to the living tree doctrine because they have been 
developed and applied within the context of originalism. This restricted 
view is part of a broader history in which the courts have long deployed 
distinctive canons of construction when considering Aboriginal issues.122 
To unequivocally show their originalism, these canons will now be 
examined in further detail by reference to case law. In the treaty realm, 
Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court first articu-
lated special interpretive principles for dealing with Indigenous peoples 
in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.123 Justice Marshall developed this 
approach to better understand and give effect to the Cherokee nation’s 
intentions at the time their treaties were negotiated.124 Justice Marshall 
broadly construed specific provisions within these treaties to understand 
the Indians’ original intent in entering such agreements. These rules 
developed through the years and they were consolidated in Jones v. 
Meehan125 in 1899, and have played an important role in the United 
                                                                                                             
121 Persons Case, supra, note 6, at 136 A.C. 
122 See Leonard Rotman, “Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian 
Aboriginal Rights Jurisprudence” (1997) 46 U.N.B.L.J. 1. 
123 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483. For further discussion of the development of Indians’ 
canons of construction in the United States, see Charles Wilkinson & John Volkman, “Judicial 
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: ‘As Long as the Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth’. 
How Long a Time is That?” (1975) 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601. 
124 Worcester v. Georgia, id., at 553-54 U.S. 
125 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), at 10-11: 
In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe, it must always ... 
be borne in mind that the negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the 
United States, an enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diploma-
cy, masters of a written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating the 
various technical estates known to their law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by 
themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by them and in their own language; that the 
Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and dependent people, who have no written lan-
guage and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose only 
knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them by the 
interpreter employed by the United States; and that the treaty must therefore be con-
strued, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the 
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians. 
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States throughout the intervening years.126 In 1990 the Canadian Su-
preme Court approvingly cited these rules in the case of R. v. Sioui.127 
The Sioui case also endorsed previous Canadian citations of these canons 
from the cases of R. v. White and Bob128 and R. v. Taylor and Williams129 
and R. v. Simon.130 The Court has continued to apply these canons to 
understand a treaty’s original intent in the cases of R. v. Horseman,131 R. 
v. Badger,132 R. v. Sundown,133 R. v. Marshall (I),134 R. v. Marshall (II),135 
R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard136 and R. v. Morris.137 
A brief review of each of these cases reveals their obvious original-
ism. The White and Bob case focused on original intent to bring out “the 
importance of the historical context, including the interpersonal relations 
of those involved at the time, in trying to determine whether a document 
falls into the category of a treaty under s. 88 of the Indian Act.”138 The 
Taylor case canvassed original intentions because “[c]ases on Indian or 
aboriginal rights can never be determined in a vacuum.”139 Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
126 The canons of Indian treaty constructed have been applied in leading U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, such as United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 971, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L. Ed. 1089 (1905); Winters 
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, at 576-77 (1908); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, at 675 (1912); 
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, at 367 (1930); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, at 
431-32 (1943); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, at 174 (1973); 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, at 195-98 (1999). 
127 [1990] S.C.J. No. 48, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sioui”]. At paras. 16, 18: 
Our courts and those of our neighbours to the south have already considered what dis-
tinguishes a treaty with the Indians from other agreements affecting them. The task is not 
an easy one. In Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, this Court adopted the com-
ment of Norris J.A. in R. v. White and Bob (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.) (af-
firmed in the Supreme Court (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481), that the courts should show 
flexibility in determining the legal nature of a document recording a transaction with the 
Indians. In particular, they must take into account the historical context and perception 
each party might have as to the nature of the undertaking contained in the document 
under consideration. ... In my opinion, this liberal and generous attitude, heedful of his-
torical fact, should also guide us in examining the preliminary question of the capacity to 
sign a treaty ... 
128 [1964] B.C.J. No. 212, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.), affd [1965] S.C.J. No. 80, 52 
D.L.R. (2d) 481n (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “White and Bob”]. 
129 [1981] O.J. No. 3135, 34 O.R. (2d) 360 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Taylor”]. 
130 [1985] S.C.J. No. 67, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Simon”]. 
131 [1990] S.C.J. No. 39, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, at 907 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Horseman”]. 
132 [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at paras. 4, 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badger”]. 
133 [1999] S.C.J. No. 13, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 393, at paras. 24-25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sundown”]. 
134 Supra, note 62, at paras. 9-14. 
135 [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, at para. 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall (II)”]. 
136 Supra, note 71, at para. 26. 
137 [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915, at para. 19 [hereinafter “Morris”]. 
138 Sioui, supra, note 127, at para. 45, citing White and Bob (B.C.C.A.), supra, note 128, at 
649. 
139 Taylor, supra, note 129, at 367. 
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Court wrote: “It is of importance to consider the history and oral tradi-
tions of the tribes concerned, and the surrounding circumstances at the 
time of the treaty, relied on by both parties, in determining the treaty’s 
effect.”140 The Simon case applied the view that “Indian treaties should 
be given a fair, large and liberal construction in favour of the Indians” to 
give effect to the “intention of creating mutually binding obligations” in 
a treaty between the Mi’kmaq and the Crown.141 The Horseman case 
held that the Court “must be prepared to look at that historical context in 
order to ensure that they reach a proper understanding of the meaning 
that particular treaties held for their signatories at the time”.142 It also 
wrote, “to put it simply, Indian treaties must be given the effect the 
signatories obviously intended them to have at the time they were 
entered into even if they do not comply with to-day’s formal require-
ments”.143 Generous “back-word” looking rules were also used to assist 
with originalist interpretations in the Badger case, which similarly sought 
to understand “the intention of the framers”.144 Sundown likewise held 
that these rules were in place to “take into account the First Nation 
signatory and the circumstances that surrounded the signing of the 
treaty”.145 Marshall I adopted the point of view of a 17th-century 
“officious bystander” to ensure that modern treaty interpretations accord 
with their original public meaning.146 The same Marshall Court also used 
originalism to “choose from among the various possible interpretations 
of the common intention [at the time the treaty was made]”.147 In Mar-
shall II the Court reiterated that the rules of treaty interpretation were 
aimed at understanding what “was in the contemplation of either or both 
parties to the 1760 treaty”.148 The Court was also firm in indicating that 
treaties “cannot be wholly transformed” by engaging in an “extended 
interpretation” of their original meaning.149 This view was reinforced in 
R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard when the Court observed that an Aboriginal 
group’s historic “activity must be essentially the same” as what was 
occurring in the past in order to receive recognition.150 Finally, the 
                                                                                                             
140 Id., at 367. 
141 Simon, supra, note 130, at para. 27. 
142 Horseman, supra, note 131, at 907. 
143 Id. 
144 Badger, supra, note 132, at paras. 4, 41. 
145 Sundown, supra, note 133, at para. 25. 
146 Marshall (I), supra, note 62, at para. 43. 
147 Id., at para. 14 (emphasis in original). 
148 Marshall (II), supra, note 135, at para. 20. 
149 Id., at para. 19. 
150 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra, note 71, at para. 25. 
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Morris case highlighted the Court’s originalist framework that “promises 
in the treaty must be placed in their historical, political, and cultural 
contexts to clarify the common intentions of the parties and the interests 
they intended to reconcile at the time”.151 
From the foregoing review it is clear that originalism plays a signifi-
cant role in the Supreme Court’s treaty jurisprudence. Generous interpre-
tative rules are consistently referenced but they are deployed to assist the 
Court’s retrospective search for meaning. These rules do not take us out 
of the past in determining the intentions of the framers or in understand-
ing an agreement’s public meaning. While treaty interpretation should 
exhibit a greater deference to history because it respects the parties’ 
agency when assigning them meaning, it should not be used to limit the 
availability of future rights not discussed during the negotiations.152 
Living tree jurisprudence does not operate within such limits. It permits 
“progressive constitutional development” which, while attentive to a 
law’s roots, also keeps its eye more firmly on the present and future by 
“structuring the exercise of power by the organs of the state in times 
vastly different from those in which it was crafted”.153 
2. Aboriginal Rights, Originalism and the Canons of Construction 
Yet originalism is not only practised in section 35(1)’s treaty juris-
prudence. It is also present in the Court’s treatment of Aboriginal rights 
and title. For example, in the Supreme Court’s first case dealing with 
Aboriginal rights, it wrote: “Section 35(1) must be given a generous, 
large and liberal interpretation and uncertainties, ambiguities or doubts 
should be resolved in favour of the natives.”154 A brief review of some of 
the leading cases in this area, such as Van der Peet,155 Delgamuukw,156 R. 
                                                                                                             
151 R. v. Morris, supra, note 137, at para. 18. 
152 By way of contrast, treaty jurisprudence in the United States does not regard treaties as 
exhaustive statements of law. Issues not discussed during treaty negotiations continue to be vested in 
Indigenous communities: see United States v. Winans, supra, note 126. In this case the Court held 
that treaties are “not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them — a reservation 
of those not granted”. Thus, anything not discussed in a treaty is retained by the tribe. This is known 
as the reserved rights doctrine; the tribes retain everything within their territory unless they 
affirmatively give it up: Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
153 Same-Sex Marriage Reference, supra, note 6, at para. 23; Ontario Home Builders’ Assn. 
v. York Region Board of Education, supra, note 13, at para. 145. 
154 R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, at para. 133 (S.C.C.). 
155 Supra, note 59. 
156 Supra, note 61. 
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v. Sappier; R. v. Gray157 and R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard158 similarly 
shows that the application of these canons is strongly correlated with the 
Court’s originalism. In fact, most section 35(1) cases do not ground their 
interpretation of Aboriginal rights on the contemporary relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. As occurs with treaties, the 
Supreme Court picks an “original” moment to guide its interpretations 
and it repeatedly uses the canons of construction to elucidate this 
moment (which the Court has itself fabricated). In the Van der Peet case 
the defining moment for recognizing and affirming Aboriginal rights is 
the one immediately prior to contact with Europeans159 because “the 
rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be temporally rooted in 
the historical presence — the ancestry — of aboriginal peoples in North 
America”.160 Under this formulation Lamer C.J.C. tautologically con-
cluded that Aboriginal rights possess “original” rights because Aboriginal 
peoples are “Aboriginal”.161 Thus, on this formulation Aboriginal rights 
can only be claimed if they are based on “practices, customs and tradi-
tions [that are rooted in the] pre-contact societies”.162 This test forces the 
parties into an originalist framework with public meaning (recognition 
and affirmation of Aboriginal rights) being assigned to first contact. 
Likewise, in the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme Court also placed 
the proof of Aboriginal title in an “original” moment. However, Delga-
muukw moved that moment from contact to sovereignty. In this regard 
the Delgamuukw court wrote that “[i]n order to establish a claim to 
aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting the claim must establish 
that it occupied the lands in question at the time at which the Crown 
asserted sovereignty over the land subject to the title.”163 The Court said 
that “sovereignty is the appropriate time period” for proving Aboriginal 
                                                                                                             
157 [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sappier”]. 
158 Supra, note 71. 
159 The Court held that the test for proving Aboriginal rights would be links to “an element 
of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming 
the right”: Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 46. 
160 Id., at para. 32. 
161 Justice Lamer distinguished Aboriginal rights from other “liberal” rights and wrote that 
“aboriginal rights must be viewed differently from Charter rights because they are rights held only 
by aboriginal members of Canadian society”. He then went on to say that Aboriginal rights “arise 
from the fact that aboriginal people are aboriginal; ... aboriginal rights ‘inhere in the very meaning 
of aboriginality’”: id., at para. 19. 
162 Id., at para. 62. For a critique of this view see Russell Barsh & Sakej Henderson, “The 
Supreme Court’s Van der Peet Trilogy: Native Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill 
L.J. 993 [hereinafter “Barsh & Henderson”]; John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitution-
al Interpretation and the Trickster” (1997) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37. 
163 Delgamuukw, supra, note 61, at para. 144 (emphasis in original). 
378 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
title because “aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was 
asserted”.164 Thus, as with Aboriginal rights, the proof of Aboriginal title 
depends on the Court assigning public meaning to a past event; in this 
case the original public meaning is said to be the recognition of underly-
ing Aboriginal title when the Crown asserted sovereignty over Aboriginal 
groups. This demonstrates how the doctrine of discovery lies at the heart 
of the Court’s originalism. Pinning constitutional meaning to the moment 
that Aboriginal rights were diminished165 actually makes the Crown the 
main recipient of the Court’s generous interpretive stance. Crown 
sovereignty and the “magic moment of European contact” as McLachlin 
J. once critically described it, become the default position for defining 
the meaning and limits of future Aboriginal rights within an originalist 
framework.166 
The Supreme Court reinforced this framework in the cases of 
Sappier167 and R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard.168 The Sappier case held 
that reference to pre-contact practice is necessary to prove Aboriginal 
rights in order “to determine how the claimed right relates to the pre-
contact culture or way of life of an aboriginal society”.169 In fact, the 
Court stated that the absence of such originalist evidence makes it next to 
impossible to claim rights under section 35(1). While the Court was 
careful to declare that “aboriginal rights are not frozen in their pre-
contact form”,170 any reasonable analysis of the Court’s originalism cannot 
evade the fact that contemporary Aboriginal practices are frozen out of 
constitutional inclusion if they do not have pre-contact correlations. They 
become frozen rights despite the Court’s reasons to the contrary.171 
                                                                                                             
164 Id., at para. 145. For a critique of crystallization of title more broadly, see John Borrows, 
Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002), at 93-94 [hereinafter “Borrows, Recovering Canada”]. 
165 The Supreme Court noted that Aboriginal rights were diminished at contact in Guerin v. 
Canada, supra, note 103, at 377-78: 
... the rights of Indians in the lands they traditionally occupied prior to European coloni-
zation both predated and survived the claims to sovereignty made by various European 
nations in the territories of the North American continent. The principle of discovery 
which justified these claims gave the ultimate title in the land in a particular area to the 
nation which had discovered and claimed it. In that respect at least the Indians’ rights in 
the land were obviously diminished; but their rights of occupancy and possession re-
mained unaffected ... (my emphasis) 
166 Justice McLachlin used this language in dissent in Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 247. 
167 Supra, note 157. 
168 Supra, note 71. 
169 Sappier, supra, note 157, at para. 22. 
170 Id., at para. 23. 
171 Barsh & Henderson, supra, note 162; John Borrows, “The Trickster: Integral to a Distinc-
tive Culture” (1997) 8:2 Const. Forum Const. 27, at 29-38. 
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The R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard case reaffirmed these principles 
and observed that the proof of Aboriginal and treaty rights both rested on 
(ab)originalist premises. Thus, the Court wrote: “The question is whether 
the aboriginal practice at the time of assertion of European sovereignty 
(not, unlike treaties, when a document was signed) translates into a 
modern legal right.”172 This sentence reveals the Court’s interpretive 
fusion of Aboriginal and treaty rights within an originalist framework. 
The application of this test led the Court to conclude that Mik’maq 
people could not claim Aboriginal title because their historic land use did 
not correspond to common law conceptions of physical occupation when 
the Crown asserted sovereignty.173 
IV. THREE ALTERNATIVES TO (AB)ORIGINALISM 
The Court does not have to adopt an originalist approach when inter-
preting Aboriginal and treaty rights. Section 35(1)’s jurisprudence could 
be brought within the constitutional mainstream by highlighting the 
contemporary nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights. Lines of authority 
more consistent with a living tree approach could be emphasized. This 
would help to ensure that the “past plays a critical but non-exclusive role 
in determining the content of [Aboriginal] rights and freedoms”.174 In 
taking this path the Supreme Court could highlight one of three promi-
nent alternatives to originalism within section 35(1). These three alterna-
tives are arguments relating to (1) the restraint of government authority; 
(2) the continuity of Aboriginal rights; and (3) the ongoing obligation of 
the Crown to act honourably in all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples. 
While history is relevant in each of these approaches, the Court more 
appropriately focuses on the contemporary aspects of the Crown’s 
relationship to Aboriginal peoples in the following examples. 
The first illustration of a living-tree-like approach to Aboriginal 
rights is found in the leading case in the field, Sparrow.175 While there 
are contrary tides in the Sparrow case, the Court did not generally link 
Aboriginal rights to a founding moment. Instead it held that the meaning 
of section 35(1) was to be “derived from general principles of constitu-
tional interpretation”.176 As a result, the Court explicitly developed these 
                                                                                                             
172 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, supra, note 71, at para. 48. 
173 Sappier, supra, note 157, at paras. 60-67. 
174 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra, note 13, at 180. 
175 Supra, note 73. 
176 Id., at 1106. 
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principles within a “framework for an interpretation ... that ... gives 
appropriate weight to the constitutional nature of these words”.177 To 
accomplish this task the Court cited the Manitoba Language Reference to 
highlight the fact that section 35(1) was to be interpreted “in accordance 
with certain principles held as fundamental and certain prescriptions 
restrictive of the powers of the legislature and government”.178 These 
statements are similar to what was said in the Persons Case, which 
declared: “That Act should be on all occasions interpreted in a large, 
liberal and comprehensive spirit, considering the magnitude of the 
subjects with which it purports to deal in very few words.”179 Putting 
canons of construction in this broader, more contemporary approach in 
the Sparrow case, the Court held that Aboriginal rights exist to restrict 
government action. This demonstrates section 35(1)’s living constitu-
tional status, which operates to both channel and constrain government 
power. In this light, the Court found that section 35 demanded that the 
government justify “any government regulation that infringes upon or 
denies aboriginal rights”.180 It said that “[s]uch scrutiny is in keeping 
with the liberal interpretive principle enunciated in Nowegijick ... and the 
concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing 
with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada ...”181 
These are not the words of originalism; instead they measure Abo-
riginal rights by a contemporary purpose, which is the “affirmation of 
aboriginal rights”.182 This is more consistent with a living tree approach. 
Construing provisions liberally in the Sparrow case is aimed at affirming 
rights, even when they grow significantly beyond their historic roots. 
Thus, when the Sparrow Court appropriately considers the past it does 
so by simultaneously emphasizing present political realities. As a result, 
the Court used generous rules of interpretation to highlight that “[t]he 
relationship between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather 
than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of 
aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.”183 
To assist in the development of this relationship the Court wrote that 
sensitivity to the Aboriginal perspective on the meaning of the right at 
                                                                                                             
177 Id., at 1016. 
178 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 
745 (S.C.C.), cited in Sparrow, supra, note 73, at 1106. 
179 Persons Case, supra, note 6, at 136 A.C. 
180 Sparrow, supra, note 73, at 1109. 
181 Id. 
182 Id., at 1106. 
183 Id., at 1108. 
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stake is crucial to its definition.184 The Court’s focus on Aboriginal 
perspectives and the constitutional nature of the parties’ current relation-
ship, as opposed to the search for its origins, is more consistent with the 
Court’s broader living tree approach to constitutional interpretation. 
A second alternative to the Supreme Court’s originalism is found 
in an aspect of the Mitchell case,185 which emphasized the continuity 
of Aboriginal rights.186 An interpretive approach that emphasizes the 
contemporary, continuing nature of Aboriginal rights is much closer to a 
living tree model. This is because a focus on continuity takes our gaze 
away from first contact and emphasizes relations between Aboriginal 
communities and the Crown since their initial encounters.187 This is also 
a more generous interpretive approach. It gives the Court some freedom 
to look beyond the initial roots of an Aboriginal right to see how its 
branches have “grown and expanded with their natural limits” (to use the 
language of the Persons Case). Nevertheless, one has to be careful in 
considering continuity as an alternative to originalism. Originalism could 
overtake the continuity thesis if too much weight is given to the common 
law’s initial recognition of Aboriginal peoples’ pre-existing law and 
interests.188 For example, the Mitchell Court is quite clear that Aboriginal 
rights would only receive protection if they had continuity with “prac-
tices, traditions or customs that existed prior to contact”.189 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                             
184 In Sparrow, id., at 1112, the Court wrote: “While it is impossible to give an easy defini-
tion of fishing rights, it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective 
itself on the meaning of the rights at stake.” 
185 Supra, note 116. 
186 For a critique of the Mitchell case, see Gordon Christie, “The Court’s Exercise of Plenary 
Power: Rewriting the Two-Row Wampum” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 285. 
187 This is most consistent with the approach which dominated U.S. Federal Indian case law 
before the U.S. Supreme Court between 1959 and the early 1980s: see Charles Wilkinson, American 
Indians, Time and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Felix Cohen was the most 
prominent proponent of this approach: see Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Washington: 
Department of Interior, 1941), at 122-23. During the Rehnquist Court era, Federal Indian case law 
became more preoccupied with originalism. For a critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach, 
see Frank Pommershein, Broken Landscapes: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Walter Echo-Hawk, In the Courts of the Conqueror: The 10 
Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided (Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum Publishing, 2010); Robert Williams, 
Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal History of Racism in 
America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). 
188 In discussing the nature of Aboriginal rights the Court observed that English law “ac-
cepted that the aboriginal peoples possessed pre-existing laws and interests” while recognizing that 
“the Crown asserted that sovereignty over the land, and ownership of its underlying title”: Mitchell, 
supra, note 116, at para. 9. 
189 Id., at para. 12. Justice McLachlin wrote: 
Stripped to essentials, an aboriginal claimant must prove a modern practice, tradition or 
custom that has a reasonable degree of continuity with the practices, traditions or customs 
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if we recognize Aboriginal peoples as complex contemporary communi-
ties, the continuity thesis has greater potential to develop along the lines 
of a living tree approach because it emphasizes the branches of Aborigi-
nal development, and not their initial recognition. Thus, the Mitchell case 
holds great potential when it observes that: 
European settlement did not terminate the interests of aboriginal 
peoples arising from their historical occupation and use of the land. To 
the contrary, aboriginal interests and customary laws were presumed to 
survive the assertion of sovereignty, and were absorbed into the 
common law as rights, unless (1) they were incompatible with the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, (2) they were surrendered voluntarily 
via the treaty process, or (3) the government extinguished them ... 
Barring one of these exceptions, the practices, customs and traditions 
that defined the various aboriginal societies as distinctive cultures 
continued as part of the law of Canada ... .190 
The presumption of the survival and continuous exercise of Aborigi-
nal rights can be a key point in rejecting originalism. While Indigenous 
peoples would strongly resist the three limitations McLachlin C.J.C. 
placed on the continuity of their rights,191 there are sound arguments that 
Indigenous rights, obligations and conflict resolution procedures are 
compatible with the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.192 Indigenous 
peoples affirm that many of their most important rights were not surren-
dered by treaties and were not extinguished by clear and plain govern-
ment legislation.193 These facts would be clearer if a living-tree-like 
reconciliation was the lens through which the courts interpreted the 
                                                                                                             
that existed prior to contact. The practice, custom or tradition must have been “integral to 
the distinctive culture” of the aboriginal peoples, in the sense that it distinguished or 
characterized their traditional culture and lay at the core of the peoples’ identity. It must 
be a “defining feature” of the aboriginal society, such that the culture would be “funda-
mentally altered” without it. It must be a feature of “central significance” to the peoples’ 
culture, one that “truly made the society what it was” (Van der Peet, supra, at paras. 54-59 
(emphasis in original)). 
190 Id., at para. 10. 
191 Gordon Christie, “Aboriginal Citizenship: Sections 35, 25 and 15 of Canada’s Constitu-
tion Act, 1982” (2003) Citizenship Studies 481-95. 
192 Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 35, at 136. 
193 See, generally, Neal McLeod, Cree Narrative Memory: From Treaties to Contemporary 
Times (Saskatoon: Purich Publications, 2007); Daniel Paul, We Were Not the Savages: A Mi’kmaq 
Perspective on the Collision between European and Native American Civilizations, 21st Century ed. 
(Halifax: Fernwood, 2000) [hereinafter “Paul, We Were Not the Savages”]; Boyce Richardson, ed., 
Drum Beat: Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989); Kiera Ladner 
& Leanne Simpson, eds., This Is an Honour Song: Twenty Years Since the Blockades (Winnipeg: 
Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2010). 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) (AB)ORIGINALISM AND CANADA’S CONSTITUTION 383 
parties’ relationships.194 They hold that their laws co-exist with common 
law and civil law traditions, and that they could be considered a strong 
part of Canada’s constitutional law in the present day. 
The continuity thesis is therefore a much stronger ground on which 
to build the interpretation of Aboriginal rights. It highlights the existing 
nature of Aboriginal rights, which allows for the growth and develop-
ment of Indigenous law and tradition as part of the law of Canada.195 
This interpretation is more consistent with the Court’s living tree consti-
tutionalism, which states that “[t]here is nothing static or frozen, narrow 
or technical, about the Constitution of Canada.”196 For this reason, the 
continuity theory of Aboriginal rights as discussed in the Mitchell case is 
an important alternative to the originalism that is found in most Aborigi-
nal rights cases. 
The third alternative to the Supreme Court’s originalism comes from 
the case of Haida Nation v. British Columbia.197 While history is once 
again relevant in the Haida case, the Court’s reasons do not inflexibly 
fasten constitutional rights and obligations to one historic moment. 
Contemporary obligations are always present under the approach taken 
in this case. This is apparent when the Court writes that “[i]n all its 
dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty to 
the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown 
must act honourably.”198 The implication of this conclusion is that 
“[r]econciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense ... it is a 
process.”199 Under this formulation rights are not time-bound; the 
fulfilment of a constitutional obligation does not begin and end by 
reference to the past. Constitutional obligations must be “determined, 
                                                                                                             
194 See Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 31: 
More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through 
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own 
practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of 
the Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in light 
of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed 
towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereign-
ty of the Crown. 
For a wide-ranging discussion of reconciliation, see Paulette Regan, University of British Columbia 
Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in 
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010). 
195 Sakej Henderson, First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights: Defining the Just 
Society (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2006). 
196 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada Trust Co., supra, note 13, at 478-79. 
197 [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida”]. 
198 Id., at para. 17. 
199 Id., at para. 32. 
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recognized and respected” in the present, especially in circumstances 
where rights have not yet been reconciled with Crown sovereignty.200 
With the contemporary nature of Aboriginal rights fully on display in the 
Haida case, the Supreme Court developed a test for the contemporary 
consultation and accommodation of Aboriginal rights. It wrote that 
constitutional duties arise “when the Crown has knowledge, real or 
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and 
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it”.201 This test reveals 
that constitutional rights are related to the Crown’s ongoing assessment 
of the impact of its activities on Aboriginal peoples. The characterization 
of the Crown’s constitutional obligation does not primarily depend on 
assigning meaning to past events. Since the constitutional relationship 
does not solely depend on initial assessments of the strength of the 
Aboriginal group’s historically based claims, the Court says this can 
foster “a relationship between the parties that makes possible negotia-
tions”, which it regards as “the preferred process for achieving ultimate 
reconciliation”.202 Clearly, the Haida case is an alternative to the Court’s 
originalism in the field of Aboriginal rights. 
If the Supreme Court further explored the contemporary implications 
of the three approaches identified in this section, Canada’s Constitution 
would be more unified and less discriminatory. Aboriginal peoples’ rights 
would be considered in a broader light, and Canada would be strength-
ened. This would be more consistent with the Privy Council’s living tree 
approach, which is that the Constitution “should be on all occasions 
interpreted in a large, liberal and comprehensive spirit, considering the 
magnitude of the subjects with which it purports to deal in very few 
words”.203 
                                                                                                             
200 Id., at para. 25. Even where reconciliation has taken place the accommodation of Abori-
ginal and treaty rights is an ongoing process: see Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, at paras. 51-58 (S.C.C.). 
201 Haida, supra, note 197, at para. 35. 
202 Id., at para. 38. 
203 Persons Case, supra, note 6, at 136 A.C. 
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V. ABORIGINAL LEGAL TRADITIONS, LIVING TREES  
AND ORIGINALISM 
The Supreme Court should also consider the state of Indigenous 
approaches to constitutional law in adopting living tree alternatives.204 
Living tree constitutionalism resembles one significant source of Indige-
nous law grounded in analogies to the natural world.205 This environmen-
tally based approach to legal interpretation develops rules for regulation 
and conflict resolution from a study of the world’s behaviour.206 Indige-
nous peoples who practise this form of law draw analogies from the 
behaviours of ecosystems, watersheds, rivers, mountains, valleys, 
meadows, lakes and shorelines to guide legal actions.207 Given this focus 
it is no surprise that Indigenous peoples would be attracted to constitu-
tional metaphors based on living things. In fact, one of the strongest 
metaphors Indigenous peoples use in describing their relations with the 
Crown is “as long as the shine shines, the grass grows, and the river 
flows”.208 This metaphor, while possessing much deeper meaning,209 is 
                                                                                                             
204 Indigenous perspectives on the law are relevant to constitutional interpretation. As the 
Supreme Court of Canada wrote in Sparrow, supra, note 73, at 1112: “it is possible, and, indeed, 
crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake”. 
205 Indigenous law based on environmental sources is discussed in greater depth in Borrows, 
Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 35, at 28-35 and Borrows, Recovering Canada, 
supra, note 164, at 29-55. 
206 An interesting example of how environmental law might develop and be operative within 
Indigenous communities is found in the writings of Julie Cruikshank: see Julie Cruikshank, Do 
Glaciers Listen? Local Knowledge, Colonial Encounters, and Social Imagination (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2005). See also William Robinson as told by Walter Wright, 
Men of Medeek, 2d ed. (Kitimat, B.C.: Northern Sentinel Press, 1962); Jo-Anne Fiske & Betty 
Patrick, Cis Dideen Kat (When the Plumes Rise): The Way of the Lake Babine Nation (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Kiera L. Ladner, “Governing Within an Ecological 
Context: Creating an AlterNative Understanding of Blackfoot Governance” (2003) 70 Studies in 
Political Economy 125, at 150; James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Mikmaw Tenure in Atlantic 
Canada” (1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 196, at 218; John Borrows, “Living Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal 
Religion, Law, and the Constitution” in Richard Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008) 161. 
207 Analogies to law and the natural world are found in many treaty speeches: see Robert 
Williams Jr., Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For a more general discussion of analogical reasoning, 
see Cass R. Sunstein, “On Analogical Reasoning”, Commentary (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741. 
208 For a discussion of this concept in law, see Wilkinson & Volkman, “Judicial Review of 
Indian Treaty Abrogation”, supra, note 123. An early use of a similar phrase is found in a treaty 
made by William Penn with the Conestoga in 1701: see Kevin Kenny, Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The 
Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn’s Holy Experiment (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), at 15: “as long as the Sun and Moon shall endure”. Benjamin Franklin reported this 
treaty as saying, “as long as the sun shall shine, or the waters run in the rivers” in Jared Sparks, ed., 
The Works of Benjamin Franklin: Autobiography, pt. 2 (Boston: MacCoun, 1882). Other associa-
tions between treaties and the phrase are found in Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty 
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usually associated with treaties and emphasizes the perpetual nature of 
agreements to live together in peace, friendship and respect.210 An 
organic, animate, growth-oriented approach to law is also found in the 
Haudenosaunee constitution, also called Kaianerekowa or Great Law of 
Peace. 211 This constitution binds the Six Iroquois Confederacy together 
under principles of peace, power and righteousness.212 The grand symbol 
of the Kaianerekowa is a Great White Pine tree with four white roots of 
peace extending in four cardinal directions.213 The tree has long needles 
that grow as the confederacy prospers.214 The nations and its people are 
allegorically seated in concentric circles around the tree, also illustrating 
                                                                                                             
Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as 
Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000), at 20; Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council with 
Walter Hildebrandt, Sarah Carter & Dorothy First Rider, The True Spirit and Original Intent of 
Treaty 7 (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1996), at 133; Rene Fumoleau, As Long as this 
Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and 11 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), at 74, 133, 
240, 257, 314, 340, 502; Arthur Ray, J.R. Miller & Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A 
History of Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000), at 116-17. For a contrary 
view about questioning the relationship of this phrase to treaties, see Sharon Venne, “Understanding 
Treaty Six: An Indigenous Perspective” in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 
Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1997) 173, at 194. 
209 For example, see Deanna Christensen, Ahtahkakoop: The Epic Account of a Plains Cree 
Head Chief, His People, and Their Vision for Survival, 1816-1896 (Shell Lake, SK: Ahtahkakoop 
Publishing, 2000), at 5-14, for a brief discussion of laws related to the sun, waters and earth. For an 
ingenious literary treatment of this idea, see Thomas King, Green Grass, Running Water (Toronto: 
Harper Collins, 1993). 
210 For example, when Alexander Morris proposed Treaty 6 he said, “What I trust and hope 
we will do is not for today or tomorrow only; what I promise and what I believe and hope you will 
take, is to last as long as that sun shines and yonder river flows”: Alexander Morris, The Treaties of 
Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, Including the Negotiations on 
Which They were Based, and other Information Relating Thereto (Saskatoon: Fifth House 
Publishers, Saskatoon, 1991), at 202; see similar words in relation to Treaty 3, at 51. This phrase was 
also used in an 1818 treaty with the Ojibway: see J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: 
Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), at 101. 
211 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire (New York: W.W. Norton and Com-
pany, 1990). 
212 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Toronto: Ox-
ford University Press, 1999). Some commentators have made “originalist-type” arguments linking 
the Great Law of Peace to the U.S. Constitution: see Donald A. Grinde, Jr., & Bruce E. Johansen, 
Exemplar of Liberty: Native America and the Evolution of Democracy (Los Angeles: American 
Indian Studies Centre 1991) [hereinafter “Grinde & Johansen”]; Bruce E. Johansen, Forgotten 
Founders: How the American Indian Helped Shape Democracy (Boston: Harvard Common Press, 
1982) [hereinafter “Johansen”]; Elizabeth Tooker, “The United States Constitution and the Iroquois 
League” [hereinafter “Tooker”] in James Clifton, ed., The Imaginary Indian: Cultural Fictions and 
Government Policy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 1996) 108. 
213 The Haudenosaunee have in times past invited others to seek shelter in their Confederacy 
and Great Law: see William Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the 
Iroquois Confederacy (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), at 73. 
214 Fenton, id., at 103. 
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growth. A great eagle sits atop the tree to watch for the peace and safety 
of the confederacy. The Great Law is a living tree.215 Aboriginal peoples 
of the Pacific Northwest also have constitutions related to trees. The 
Haida, Nisga’a, Gitskan, Wetsuwet’en, Tsimshian, Tahltan, Tlingit, 
Salish, Heiltsuk, Nuu-Chah-Nulth and Kwakwaka’wakw all carve poles 
that communicate their relationships to territory, ancestors and the 
natural world around them.216 Unlike living trees, which metaphorically 
grow forever, totem poles are designed to eventually fall down and decay 
as they return to the earth. This reinforces the idea that constitutional 
laws, though carved from deep histories, are to be re-inscribed every few 
generations to ensure they remain relevant through time.217 Thus, this 
metaphor produces effects that are similar to the living tree doctrine. 
Other Indigenous peoples in Canada also root their highest laws in 
analogies related to living beings.218 
                                                                                                             
215 Anishinaabe people at the time also formulated law based on living trees. One such 
example comes in a council at Detroit in 1773. In this case a Shawane chief named Tshwabame was 
speaking on behalf of Anishinaabe people who were accused of murdering several fur traders. In the 
course of his speech he recalled that when their British Father replaced their French Father at Detroit 
he “planted a Tree” so that whenever “any bad thing” should happen they could “assemble at s[aid] 
tree & talk together” and “try to moderate any difficulties”: Speech of Tshwabame Shawanese & 
Minitowabe Chiefs, with Sixteen Sawinan Indians who brot in ye three Murderers of Pond &c., 
Detroit, 9-10 May 1773, Haldimand Add. 21,670: 42-45. I thank Mark Walters for bringing this 
reference to my attention. 
216 For a discussion of First Nations’ use of trees and poles in communicating their laws and 
political relationships, see Marius Barbeau, Totem Poles (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1950); Michael 
D. Blackstock, Faces in the Forest: First Nations Art Created on Living Trees (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s Press, 2001). 
217 Johnny Mack has observed that the Nuu-chah-nuulth nation 
cannot rely on a reified constitutional order because they are living in a constant state of 
renewal, where history is brought to the present by carvers/weavers whose hand is greatly 
inspired by contemporary, lived experience as well as the past that, of course, constitutes 
the present. ... [T]he phrase “dead tree constitutionalism” [seems] to capture the corporeal 
character of the indigenous constitutional order. That is to say, the constitutions, much 
like ourselves, have a physicality and life expectancy. Thus, we are charged with the 
responsibility of knowing the histories reflected in the totems and, having lived within the 
world normativised by them, go about the task of carving/weaving new ones. 
Personal communication, April 11, 2012. He has written about this issue more generally in Johnny 
Mack, Thickening Totems Thinning Imperialism (LL.M. Thesis, University of Victoria, 2009), at 
128-36 [unpublished]. 
218 Paul, We Were Not the Savages, supra, note 193, at 156 (comparing political authority to 
the light of the moon); Jean-Guy Goulet, Ways of Knowing: Experience, Knowledge and Power 
Among the Dene Tha (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1998), at 61-107; Andie 
Diane Palmer, Maps of Experience: The Anchoring of Land to Story in Secwepmec Discourse 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), at 118-35; Looking Forward, Looking Back, supra, 
note 91, at ch. 4; Fikret Berkes, Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource 
Management (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis, 1999); Robert Brighton, Grateful Prey: Rock 
Cree Human-Animal Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Antonia Mills, 
Eagle Down is Our Law: Witsuwit’en Feasts and Land Claims (Vancouver: University of British 
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None of the above references suggest that the living tree doctrine as 
proclaimed by the Privy Council has its origins in Aboriginal peoples’ 
law.219 Each legal tradition independently embraced living constitution-
alism on its own terms. The same could be said about originalism. 
Aboriginal peoples can be originalists too, in relation to their own laws, 
and in relation to Canada’s broader constitutional traditions. In fact, 
originalist and dynamic interpretative practices are present in most 
traditions. For example, originalism has similarities to Biblical and 
Koranic literalism,220 and living constitutionalism has parallels with 
biblical hermeneutics and religious syncretism.221 These examples often 
have relevance for constitutional interpretation.222 Aboriginal peoples’ 
legal perspectives and practices are as varied as other legal traditions in 
the world, even within particular communities. Thus, when considering 
Indigenous peoples’ own constitutional traditions it is important to 
recognize the diversity of approaches within these societies, including 
originalism. 
For example, Indigenous laws privileging originalism in a Cree 
community are on display in the Sawridge decision.223 This case consid-
                                                                                                             
Columbia Press, 1994), at 122; Mariano Aupilaarjuk et al., Interviewing Inuit Elders, Vol. 2: 
Perspectives on Traditional Law, Jarich Oosten, Frédéric Laugrand & Wim Rasing, eds. (Iqaluit: 
Nunavut Arctic College, 1999). 
219 This is contrary to the claim of some scholars in the United States that the U.S. constitu-
tion was partially inspired by Indigenous legal traditions: see Grinde & Johansen, supra, note 212; 
Johansen, supra, note 212; Tooker, supra, note 212. 
220 For a discussion of the similarities and differences between originalism and biblical lite-
ralism, see Peter Smith & Robert Tuttle, “Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Interpretation” 
(2011) 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693; Jaroslav Pelikan, Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Karen Armstrong, The Bible: A Biography (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007). For arguments about literalism and dynamic interpretation under the 
Koran, see Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Anver Emon, “Techniques and Limits of Legal Reasoning in Shari’a Today” (2009) 2 Berkeley 
Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law, at 101-24; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Law and 
Society: The Interplay of Revelation and Reason in the Shariah” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford 
History of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 107-10. 
221 Bruce Corley & Steve W. Lemke, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Introduction 
to Interpreting Scripture, 2d ed. (Nashville: Broadman and Holman: 2009); Michael Fishbane, The 
Garments of Torah: Essays in Biblical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992); Henry Virkler, Hermeneutics: Principles and Processes of Biblical Interpretation (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker House Books, 1991). For a philosophical application of hermeneutics, see Hans 
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall, trans., 2d rev. ed. (New York: 
Crossroad, 2004); Charles Stewart, Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism: The Politics of Religious Synthesis 
(New York: Routledge, 1994). 
222 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
223 Sawridge Band v. Canada, [1995] F.C.J. No. 1013, [1996] 1 F.C. 3 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter 
“Sawridge”]. The Federal Court of Appeal determined that the trial judges’ decision raised a 
reasonable apprehension of bias: see Sawridge Band v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 794, [1997] 3 F.C. 
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ered a First Nation’s constitutional obligations to accept women as 
members when they had been disenfranchised and re-enfranchised by the 
Indian Act.224 Only First Nations women’s legal status was at issue 
because Indian men did not lose Indian status under the Act.225 The 
Sawridge Band argued they had no obligation to accept First Nations 
women as citizens if they married non-Indian men. Testimony was given 
to make the point that it was Cree custom “since aboriginal times” until 
the present day for women to take their husband’s membership status, or 
lack thereof.226 Thus, if women “married out” and lost their Indian status, 
the Band argued that this was consistent with original Cree principles. 
This law, regarded as fundamental to the way the community constituted 
itself, was that “woman follows man”. Agnes Smallboy, an elder in the 
trial, testified as follows: 
Q. MR. HEALEY: How did you come to be a member of the 
Ermineskin Band? 
A. When I was young, I married into the reserve to a man who was 
named Pete Morin. 
Q. What Indian band did you belong to before you married Pete Morin? 
                                                                                                             
580 (C.A.). The subsequent history of this case eventually led to its dismissal: see Sawridge First 
Nation v. Canada, [2008] F.C.J. No. 389, 2008 FC 322 (F.C.); Sawridge Band v. Canada, [2009] 
F.C.J. No. 465, 2009 FCA 123 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 248 (S.C.C.). 
224 For commentary on this case, see Joyce Green, “Constitutionalizing the Patriarchy: Ab-
original Women and Aboriginal Government” (1993) 4 Const. Forum Const. 4; Joyce Green, 
Exploring Identity and Citizenship: Aboriginal Women, Bill C-31 and the Sawridge Case (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Alberta, 1997) [unpublished]; Joyce Green, “Canaries in the Mines of 
Citizenship: Indian Women in Canada” (2001) 34 Canadian Journal of Political Science 4; Thomas 
Isaac, “Case Commentary: Self-Government, Indian Women and Their Rights of Reinstatement 
under the Indian Act: A Comment on Sawridge Band v. Canada” [1995] 4 C.N.L.R. 1. 
225 For a review of this history, see Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: 
Perspectives and Realities, Vol. 4 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1996), at 24-36. 
Important cases challenging the Indian Act’s discrimination against Indian women are as follows: 
Lavell v. Canada (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 
(S.C.C.); Lovelace v. Canada, 36 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XVIII, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 
(1981); McIvor v. Canada (Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs), [2007] B.C.J. No. 1259, 2007 
BCSC 827, [2007] 3 C.N.L.R. 72 (B.C.S.C.); McIvor v. Canada (Registrar, Indian and Northern 
Affairs), [2009] B.C.J. No. 669, 306 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (B.C.C.A.); McIvor v. Canada (Registrar, 
Indian and Northern Affairs), [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 234 (S.C.C.). To partially remedy sex-based 
discrimination in the Indian Act, Parliament passed two amendments to the Indian Act: An Act to 
amend the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (1st Supp.) (Bill C-31); and Gender Equity and the Indian 
Registration Act, R.S.C. 2010, c. 18 (Bill C-3). 
226 Sawridge, supra, note 223, at 46, 116 (F.C.T.D.). 
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A. I was a member of the Sampson Band. In our language, we call it 
“the land of the willows”. [TT3, at page 270.] 
Q. MR. HEALEY: Why did you leave your band and join the 
Ermineskin Band when you married Pete Morin? 
A. I did not know the man before I married him. In our system, a 
woman ... or the parents made arrangements for the marriage of their 
daughters. And when my parents told me that I was to go and live with 
this man, I obeyed my parents. ... 
Q. Does the woman always go with the man as you did in the 
Ermineskin Band? 
A. Yes, that was the way it was — or has been. 
Q. Is that the Indian way today? 
A. It is still the way it is today. ...227 
The argument to sustain the practice of “woman follows man”, as 
described in this case, can be labelled as originalist. It seeks to maintain 
the imputed first intentions of Cree ancestors and the Creator,228 and it 
vests this practice with public values considered foundational to Cree 
political organization, at least by those making these arguments.229 While 
we should not forget that there are diverse viewpoints within Indigenous 
law,230 some of which may vigorously oppose discrimination,231 other 
                                                                                                             
227 Id., at 92-93 F.C. 
228 Wayne Roan testified at trial: 
... the supreme being that gave me the language to identify these things. That’s the way 
he said it. That’s the way I believe it, that’s the way I recognize it, and nothing you’re 
going to say is going to change that. It is part of my way of life. It is not yours, it is my 
way. All I’m doing here is for you to try and understand I put into place, that’s the way 
things worked. 
Id., at 100 F.C. 
229 Elders in the Sawridge case regarded the idea of “woman follows man” as being founda-
tional to Cree organization. They argued that Cree ways would be threatened if women who have 
non-native husbands did not follow them off the reserve when they married. These values are clearly 
discriminatory and cannot be excused by reference to original Cree teachings and law. Nevertheless, 
Elder Sophie Mackinaw testified at trial: “I want to talk specifically about the white husband in this 
instance. It is not clear that the white husband is going to be able to accept our ways and live the way 
we are. It may be that the white man who comes to live on our reserve will want to impose his own 
values, his ways which he is familiar with on us, on our communities”: id., at 29 F.C. 
230 For an excellent discussion of the rich diversity of Indigenous legal thought, see Val 
Napoleon, Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law and Legal Theory (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
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Indigenous communities have also made arguments that originalism 
requires discriminatory results.232 As argued above, (Ab)originalism 
should not be used to sustain discrimination. Discriminatory originalism 
is problematic, regardless of its nature and source. Whether used by 
distinguished members of the Supreme Court of Canada, or by respected 
elders within Indigenous communities, adverse discrimination should 
be rejected as contrary to other constitutional approaches within each 
tradition.233 
There are also reasons to reject originalism even in cases where dis-
crimination is not at issue. As suggested earlier, it is an unbalanced 
approach because it does not sufficiently contextualize the present and 
future tenses of constitutional law. Furthermore, originalism does not 
offer any greater determinacy than alternative interpretive approaches. 
Though not a Canadian example, the following illustration raises these 
issues. It involves the Ottawa First Nation, a people also Indigenous to 
Canada. The Ottawa are Anishinaabek people who are divided by the 
border between Canada and the United States. As such, they are found on 
Manitoulin Island in Ontario and in communities around northern Lake 
Huron and Lake Michigan. The Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, a 
sub-group of the larger nation, resides on the eastern shores of Lake 
Michigan around Manistee Michigan. They are organized under a 
constitution that consists of a nine-member elected Council, an elected 
                                                                                                             
Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009), online: <http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/handle/1828/
1392/napoleon%20dissertation%20April%2026-09.pdf?sequence=1>. 
231 For internal Indigenous opposition to discrimination on the basis of sex within Indi-
genous communities, see the work of the Native Women’s Association of Canada, online: 
<http://www.nwac.ca/>. Indigenous women have developed important critiques of discrimination 
from within many Indigenous traditions: see Val Napoleon, “Aboriginal Discourse: Gender, Identity 
and Community” in Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds., Indigenous Peoples 
and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009); Sarah Deer, 
B. Clairmont & C.A. Martell, eds., Sharing our Stories of Survival: Native Women Surviving 
Violence (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2008). 
232 Arguments made by Indigenous peoples that appear to be originalist in the U.S. context 
are found in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); In the Matter of Village Authority 
to Remove Tribal Council Representative (Bacavi Certified Question) (February 11, 2010) No. 2008-
AP-0001 (Hopi Appellate Court); In re Menefee (May 5, 2004) No. 97-12-092-CV, 2004 WL 
5714978 (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Tribal Court); Kavena v. Hopi 
Indian Tribal Court (March 21, 1989) NAHT 0000002 (Hopi Appellate Court); Allen v. Cherokee 
Nation Tribal Council (2006) 6 Am. Tribal Law 18 (Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals Tribunal). 
233 Indigenous peoples are traditional, modern and post-modern and their constituting laws 
should constantly be cross-referenced to ensure that rights are not frozen in the past: see Borrows, 
Recovering Canada, supra, note 164, at 75-76. 
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Ogema (Chief) and a Tribal Court.234 The Ottawa Tribal Court constantly 
grapples with different modes of constitutional interpretation in making 
its decisions, as occurs in the other 330 Tribal Courts in the United 
States.235 This struggle is found in the case of Champagne v. Little River 
Band of Indians, decided before the Little River Band of Indians Court of 
Appeal.236 
The issue in the Champagne case was whether the Tribal Council’s 
statutory incorporation of certain provisions of Michigan State criminal 
law was contrary to the Little River Ottawa Band Constitution. A former 
Tribal Court judge, who had been convicted of the crime of attempted 
fraud under an Ottawa Band statute, argued that the adoption of Michi-
gan law that criminalized the crime of attempted fraud was an unconsti-
tutional “abrogation of tribal sovereignty and a violation of tribal 
customs and traditions”.237 He contended that the Michigan-inspired 
                                                                                                             
234 See Constitution of the Little River Band of Indians of Manistee, Michigan, online: 
<https://www.lrboi-nsn.gov/council/docs/Constitution%20-%202004%20Amendments.pdf>. The 
Preamble reads: 
We, the Little River Ottawa people have asserted our sovereignty throughout history 
including in the Treaty of Chicago [August 29, 1821; 7 Stat 218], the Treaty of Washing-
ton [March 28, 1836; 7 Stat 491], and the Treaty of Detroit [July 31, 1855; 11 Stat 621]. 
Between the last treaty and the present day, the Grand River Ottawa people who be-
came the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians were known and organized under several 
names, including members of “Indian Village” on the Manistee River, residents of the 
Pere Marquette Village or “Indian Town”, Unit No. 7 of the Northern Michigan Ottawa 
Association, the Thornapple River Band, and finally the Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians. 
On September 21, 1994, Public Law 103-324 (108 Stat 2156) was enacted, reaffirm-
ing federal recognition of and confirming the sovereignty of the Grand River Bands com-
prising the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians (referred to as the Tribe or Little River 
Band). 
As an exercise of our sovereign powers, in order to organize for our common good, to 
govern ourselves under our own laws, to maintain and foster our tribal culture, provide 
for the welfare and prosperity of our people, and to protect our homeland we adopt this 
constitution, in accordance with the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, as 
amended, as the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians. 
The Band also has a bureaucracy consisting of 28 different departments administering programs and 
processes necessary to running a modern government. 
235 The varied interpretive approaches within Tribal Courts can be studied in Matthew 
Fletcher, American Indian Tribal Law (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011) [hereinafter “Fletcher”]; 
Justin Richland & Sarah Deer, eds., Introduction to Tribal Legal Studies, 2d ed. (Lanham, MD: 
Altamira Press, 2010); Carrie Garrow & Sarah Deer, eds., Tribal Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, 2004); Raymond Austin, Navajo Courts and Navajo Common Law: 
A Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Justin 
Richland, Arguing with Tradition: The Language of Law in Hopi Tribal Court (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2008). 
236 Case No. 06-178-AP, June 2007 (Little River Band of Indians Court of Appeal); see also 
Fletcher, id., at 405-12. 
237 Id., at 409-10. 
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statute was inconsistent with Anishinaabek traditions and tribal law, and 
was therefore unconstitutional. The Little Ottawa Band Court of Appeal 
rejected these arguments. While noting that it was laudable to seek the 
development of a “sophisticated legal system based on Anglo-American 
legal models [which] preserves the cultural distinctiveness of Ottawa 
culture through the development of tribal law and the preservation of 
tribal customs and traditions”, the Court of Appeal nevertheless found 
that the judge “attempted to procure money that was not owed to him”.238 
It held that “Justice Champagne does not and cannot identify an Ottawa 
custom or tradition that would excuse him for his actions.”239 The 
accused judge believed that the Band’s statute was unconstitutional 
because the crime of “attempt” was not found in their pre-contact laws, 
whereas the Court of Appeal held that the crime of “attempt” was 
consistent with the First Nation’s broader powers under the constitution 
unless there was evidence to the contrary. If the Court had concluded its 
opinion at this point the case would have nicely illustrated two different 
views of originalism within Anishinaabek constitutionalism. This would 
have demonstrated originalism’s indeterminacy given the contradictory 
nature of the parties’ understanding of, and approach to, history.240 
However, the Little River Band Court of Appeal went one step further 
and held that appeals to originalism would not completely solve the 
issue. The Court thus wrote: “It would be a sad day for this community to 
acknowledge that an action reflecting an intention of an individual to 
fraudulently procure money from the Band is excused because the word 
‘attempt’ does not exist in Anishinaabemowin, as Justice Champagne 
alleged at oral argument.”241 Thus, the Court concluded that appeals to 
history alone would not answer the question in this case. In these and 
other reasons the Court indicated that concerns aside from originalism 
would guide their reasons. 
                                                                                                             
238 Id., at 410. 
239 Id. 
240 There is a vast literature discussing the indeterminacy of originalism in the U.S. context: 
see Thomas McAfee, “Originalism and Indeterminacy” (1996) 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 429 
(1996); Reva B. Siegel, “Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller” (2008) 
122 Harv. L. Rev. 191; Erwin Chemerinsky, Intepreting the Constitution (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1987), at 75-80; Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding” 
(1980) 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204. The Supreme Court of Canada also discussed originalism, in relation 
to the Charter: see Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), supra, note 13, at 
paras. 51-53. 
241 Fletcher, supra, note 235, at 410. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Originalism within an Indigenous legal context can be as problematic 
as it is within Canada’s broader framework. Ultimately, one must make a 
distinction between history as a source of authority in constitutional law 
and originalism. Nothing in this paper should be construed as rejecting 
appropriate historical context when interpreting Aboriginal and treaty 
rights. Aboriginal peoples’ laws and relations lie at the roots of Canada’s 
living tree, and are necessary to its subsequent healthy development. 
History is an important resource in understanding and developing 
constitutional relationships; without it we would cease to be ruled by law 
and be cut off from guidance available from the past. Thus, non-
discriminatory historical understandings should influence the interpreta-
tion of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the Canadian constitution. 
Thus, while this paper rejects originalism, it does not reject history. 
My arguments are a matter of emphasis. My objection to originalism is 
related to how it excludes other modes of interpretation as applied to 
Aboriginal peoples. It has been deployed in narrow and inflexible ways. 
It has been used to hold that constitutional rights do not exist without 
historic analogues. When used in this fashion originalism trumps other 
modes of constitutional interpretation. Constitutional claims are limited 
by what was “integral to a distinctive culture” prior to European contact 
or the “assertion” of Crown sovereignty.242 If an Aboriginal group has 
signed a treaty with the Crown, constitutional rights cannot be claimed 
unless they are connected to the common intention between the parties at 
the time an agreement was made.243 All this is to say that the Court has 
not just looked to history as a source of authority in Aboriginal cases; it 
has used history to exclude rights that could be recognized through other 
interpretive forms. This approach and the results it produces are inconsis-
tent with Canada’s broader living tree tradition. 
While this paper argues for a clear rejection of originalism, lest I be 
misunderstood, I want to conclude by re-emphasizing the importance of 
history as a very important resource for legal reasoning.244 I will do so by 
returning to the Champagne v. Little River Band of Indians case, decided 
                                                                                                             
242 Van der Peet, supra, note 59, at para. 46, and Delgamuukw, supra, note 61, at para. 144. 
243 Marshall (I), supra, note 62, at para. 14. 
244 The importance of a non-exclusivist use of history in constitutional law is found in Refer-
ence re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra, note 13, at 180: “The doctrine of the 
constitution as a living tree mandates that narrow technical approaches are to be eschewed,” which 
means that “the past plays a critical but non-exclusive role in determining the content of the rights 
and freedoms granted by the Charter”. 
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before the Little River Band of Indians Court of Appeal,245 discussed 
above. While this Court rejected originalism, it did not turn its back on 
history. In fact, the Court draws upon historical sources in framing its 
opinion. It did so by citing stories related to Nanaboozhoo, the Anishi-
naabe trickster.246 These stories function as law in Anishinaabek commu-
nities. Thus, the Court wrote: 
There are many trickster tales told by the Anishinaabek involving the 
godlike character Nanabozho. One story relevant to the present matter 
is a story that is sometimes referred to as “The Duck Dinner.” See, e.g., 
John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law 
47-49 (2002); Charles Kawbawgam, “Nanabozho in a Time of 
Famine”, in Ojibwa Narratives Of Charles and Charlotte Kawbawgam 
and Jacques LePique, 1893-1895, at 33 (Arthur P. Bourgeios, ed. 
1994); Beatrice Blackwood, “Tales of the Chippewa Indians”, 40 
Folklore 315, 337-38 (1929). There are many, many versions of this 
story, but in most versions, Nanabozho is hungry, as usual. After a 
series of failures in convincing (tricking) the woodpecker and muskrat 
spirits into being meals, Nanabozho convinces (tricks) several ducks 
and kills them by decapitating them. He eats his fill, saves the rest for 
later, and takes a nap. He orders his buttocks to wake him if anyone 
comes along threatening to steal the rest of his duck dinner. During the 
night, men approach. Nanabozho’s buttocks warn him twice: “Wake 
up, Nanabozho. Men are coming.” Kawbawgam, supra, at 35. 
Nanabozho ignores his buttocks and continues to sleep. When he 
awakens to find the remainder of his food stolen, he is angry. But he 
does not blame himself. Instead, he builds up his fire and burns his 
buttocks as punishment for their failure to warn him. To some extent, 
the trick has come back to haunt Nanabozho — and in the end, with his 
short-sightedness, he burns his own body. 
The relevance of this timeless story to the present matter is apparent. 
The trial court, per Judge Brenda Jones Quick, tried and convicted the 
defendant and appellant, Hon. Ryan L. Champagne, a tribal member, an 
                                                                                                             
245 Case No. 06-178-AP, June 2007 (Little River Band of Indians Court of Appeal); see also 
Fletcher, supra, note 235, at 405-12. 
246 For a discussion of the trickster, see John Borrows, “With or Without You: First Nations’ 
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appellate justice, and a member of this Court, of the crime of attempted 
fraud. Justice Champagne’s primary job during the relevant period in 
this case was with the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians. Part of his 
job responsibilities included leaving the tribal place of business in his 
personal vehicle to visit clients. While on one of these trips, Justice 
Champagne took a personal detour and was involved in an accident. 
The Band and later the trial judge concluded that his claim for 
reimbursement from the Band was fraudulent. Judge Quick found that 
Justice Champagne “attempted to obtain money by seeking reimburse-
ment from the Tribe for the loss of his vehicle by intentionally making 
a false assertion that he was on his way to a client’s home at the time of 
the accident.” People v. Champagne, Opinion and Judgment at 6, No. 
06-131-TM (Little River Band Tribal Court, Dec. 1, 2006) (Champagne 
III). Justice Champagne was neither heading toward the tribal offices 
nor toward a client’s home. 
Like Nanabozho, Justice Champagne perpetrated a trick upon the Little 
River Ottawa community — a trick that has come back to haunt him. It 
would seem to be a small thing involving a relatively small sum of 
money, but because the Little River Ottawa people have designated 
this particular “trick” a criminal act, Justice Champagne has burned 
himself. ...247 
After this introduction, the Little River Band Court of Appeal’s rea-
sons for judgment go to great lengths to substantiate this conclusion. 
They demonstrate a positive, non-discriminatory use of history in 
showing how the crime of attempt is not contrary to Anishinaabek 
constitutionalism. They simultaneously use history and move beyond it 
by deploying traditional law in the present tense. Nanaboozhoo’s Duck 
dinner case is a significant source of authority for judging the wrong-
fulness of the judge’s attempted fraud.248 Ironically, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
247 Supra, note 245. 
248 Elsewhere, I have argued: 
Nanabush roams from place to place and fulfills his goals by using ostensibly contradic-
tory behaviors such as charm and cunning, honesty and deception, kindness and mean 
tricks. The trickster also displays transformative power as he takes on new personae in 
the manipulation of these behaviors and in the achievement of his objectives. Lessons are 
learned as the trickster engages in actions which in some particulars are representative of 
the listener’s behavior, and on other points are uncharacteristic of their comportment. The 
trickster encourages an awakening of understanding because listeners are compelled to 
confront and reconcile the notion that their ideas may be partial and their viewpoints 
limited. Nanabush can kindle these understandings because his actions take place in a 
perplexing realm that partially escapes the structures of society and the cultural order of 
things. 
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of Canada has not used history in this fashion, to this point because its 
originalism and “generous” canons of construction have not allowed 
Indigenous law to grow in this way.249 Originalism has thus stunted 
the growth of Canada’s Indigenous Constitution.250 Fortunately, the 
citation of Indigenous law, as a past, present and future-oriented part of 
Canada’s Constitution could help nourish and sustain a living tree 
constitutionalism. 
If living tree principles were applied to Aboriginal peoples, we could 
one day say about Canada’s Aboriginal and treaty rights jurisprudence: 
“This metaphor has endured as the preferred approach in constitutional 
interpretation, ensuring ‘that Confederation can be adapted to new social 
realities’.”251 We would have an Aboriginal jurisprudence which holds 
that “‘frozen concepts’ reasoning runs contrary to one of the most 
fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our 
Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, 
accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life”.252 We would 
also apply the view that: “[t]here is nothing static or frozen, narrow or 
technical, about the Constitution of Canada.”253 Thus, we would say, 
about Aboriginal and treaty rights: “If the Canadian Constitution is to be 
regarded as a ‘living tree’ and legislative competence as ‘essentially 
dynamic’... then the determination of categories existing in 1867 be-
comes of little, other than historic, concern.”254 This would allow us to 
reinforce an approach that holds that: “the past plays a critical but 
non-exclusive role in determining the content of the rights and freedoms” 
within the Constitution.255 As such, we could conclude in relation to 
Aboriginal and treaty rights: “The tree is rooted in past and present 
institutions, but must be capable of growth to meet the future.”256 If 
originalism was rejected in favour of living tree constitutionalism in 
ways consistent with the spirit of this paper, Aboriginal and treaty rights 
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250 For an in-depth discussion of the place of Indigenous law in Canada’s Constitution, see 
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 35. 
251 Securities Reference, supra, note 15, at para. 56, also citing Reference re Employment 
Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, supra, note 13, at para. 9, per Deschamps J. 
252 Same-Sex Marriage Reference, supra, note 6, at para. 22. 
253 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada Trust Co., supra, note 13, at 478-79. 
254 Id., at 479 (emphasis in original). 
255 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), supra, note 13, at 180. 
256 Id. 
398 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
would be more strongly rooted in “a philosophy which is capable of 
explaining the past and animating the future”.257 Interpreting Aboriginal 
and treaty rights as living traditions would mark an important maturation 
point in the ongoing evolution of Canada’s organic constitution.258 This 
would stand in significance alongside the achievement of responsible 
government, the extension of women’s political rights in the Persons 
Case and the extension of civil rights before the Charter came into 
force.259 We must not “read the provisions of the Constitution like a last 
will and testament lest it become one”.260 This goes for Aboriginal and 
treaty rights, as much as it does for other parts of Canada’s Constitution. 
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